The iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority (iSimangaliso) is the management authority for the iSimangaliso Wetland Park, a World Heritage Site since 1999. The St Lucia Estuary forms the core of the park. Historically, the Umfolozi River meandered through the floodplain, but was canalised and diverted by farms. From 1956, the Umfolozi and St Lucia estuary mouths were actively kept separated, which resulted in loss of freshwater to the St Lucia system and increased salinity levels during dry periods, adversely impacting the ecosystem. In July 2010, iSimangaliso published a management strategy to restore the ecological functioning of the St Lucia system by allowing natural operation of the combined mouths. The appellants are sugar cane farmers (Umfolozi Sugar Planters Limited and two individual shareholders, Paul Van Rooyen and Petros Maphumulo) whose farms are located in the floodplain. Following rainfall in March/April 2015, back flooding occurred on the appellants' farms. The Umfolozi River mouth had closed naturally on 16 January 2015. After initial breaching by iSimangaliso in May 2015, the mouth closed again. The appellants launched three urgent applications seeking orders compelling iSimangaliso to breach the mouth and to develop estuarine management plans. A consent order was granted on 15 October 2015 providing for breaching when water levels reached specified thresholds. The appellants subsequently brought two contempt applications alleging non-compliance with the consent order. During the course of the litigation, the appellants abandoned their original relief and sought amended relief including orders relating to the development of an estuarine management plan and a declaration that iSimangaliso must prevent and drain back flooding on their farmland.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including those of two counsel where so employed.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Where a management plan required to be developed under legislation has been approved and gazetted after the court a quo's judgment but before the appeal, and this renders the relief sought moot, the appeal will be dismissed on grounds of mootness. (2) A party cannot on appeal seek to advance a case that was specifically abandoned before the court below. (3) Declaratory orders in environmental matters must be sufficiently clear and determinate to enable compliance. Impermissibly vague declaratory orders violate the rule of law as a founding constitutional principle and will not be granted. (4) Courts will not grant declaratory orders on hypothetical, abstract or academic issues, but rather require an existing, future or contingent dispute. (5) In motion proceedings, new relief cannot be sought for the first time in heads of argument where it is not foreshadowed in the affidavits, as this denies the opposing party the opportunity to respond. (6) Interim orders are provisional and conditional upon confirmation; when discharged, there is nothing to revive on appeal as it is as if no order were made in the first place. (7) Environmental management authorities acting within their statutory mandates based on scientific research are entitled to judicial deference, particularly where applicants do not challenge the lawfulness or scientific basis of environmental decisions through proper administrative law remedies.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) Back flooding on a floodplain is a natural process (noting the Court was willing to accept this). (2) The Court observed that the appellants' engineer had in 2011 recommended considering abandoning certain cane areas in favour of better placed lands, and a specialist report from 2002 showed the farms had slumped approximately 1 metre in 26 years, both of which the appellants failed to address. (3) The Court noted approvingly that in motion proceedings, affidavits constitute both pleadings and evidence, and where there is conflict, an applicant seeking final relief must accept the respondent's version unless it does not raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or is far-fetched or clearly untenable (applying the Plascon-Evans principle). (4) The Court commented that litigants who are required to comply with court orders at risk of contempt must know with clarity what is required of them. (5) The Court observed that the appellants had at all stages been consulted during the research, formulation and implementation of the management strategy from 2008 onwards, their views were heard, they raised no objection, and they did not challenge the strategy plan or any administrative action taken by iSimangaliso.
This case is significant in South African environmental law for several reasons: (1) It affirms the primacy of environmental protection and ecological restoration over private economic interests where land is located within ecologically sensitive areas such as World Heritage Sites and estuarine functional zones. (2) It demonstrates the court's approach to mootness in environmental litigation where management plans have been approved and gazetted during the pendency of proceedings. (3) It reinforces procedural requirements in motion proceedings, particularly that parties cannot advance cases not properly canvassed in affidavits and cannot seek relief on appeal that was abandoned in the court below. (4) It establishes strict requirements for declaratory orders in the environmental context, requiring precision and clarity rather than vague, open-ended directives. (5) It illustrates the deference courts give to environmental management authorities acting within their statutory mandates based on scientific research, particularly where applicants fail to challenge the scientific basis or lawfulness of environmental decisions. (6) It recognizes that natural processes such as back flooding on floodplains may need to be accommodated to restore ecosystem functioning, even where private property interests are affected. The case is an important application of the World Heritage Convention Act and the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act.