The Road Accident Fund & Others v Mautla and Others

The Road Accident Fund (RAF), its Chairperson and CEO (as applicants) appealed against a full court of the High Court (Gauteng Division) order. The respondents, individuals pursuing compensation claims under the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, had brought a review application after experiencing difficulties lodging claims due to the RAF's revised compliance rules and new RAF1 Form published via directives and board notices in 2021. The full court on 6 November 2023 granted the relief sought, declaring the directives and notices invalid and finding the RAF lacked power to adopt these decisions, and that the Minister of Transport could not delegate his powers to the RAF. The high court refused leave to appeal. Two judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal (the petition judges) dismissed the RAF's subsequent application for leave to appeal on 15 March 2024, applying a test for 'special leave to appeal' rather than 'ordinary leave'. The RAF then applied for reconsideration under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act. Pending this, a second review application (the LPIIF application) was brought involving similar issues; the high court granted leave to appeal in that matter, and the appeal was enrolled for hearing on 17 February 2026.

• Whether exceptional circumstances existed to reconsider the petition judges' refusal of leave to appeal under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
• Whether the petition judges erred by applying the test for 'special leave to appeal' under s 16(1)(b) instead of the test for 'ordinary leave to appeal' under s 17(1)
• Whether leave to appeal should be granted on the basis of reasonable prospects of success or compelling reasons under s 17(1)
• The proper interpretation of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act regarding who determines the existence of exceptional circumstances
• Whether there were compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal given the overlap with the pending LPIIF appeal

1. The application for reconsideration was granted. 2. The order dated 15 March 2024 dismissing the applicants' application for leave to appeal was set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 3. The costs order of the high court dismissing the application for leave to appeal was set aside and the costs of the application for leave to appeal in both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the high court were made costs in the appeal, with the proviso that if the applicants do not proceed with the appeal, the applicants are to pay the costs. 4. The costs of the application for reconsideration were made costs in the appeal.

1. Where a high court sits as a court of first instance, an application for leave to appeal must be determined under s 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act (the 'ordinary leave' test), not under s 16(1)(b) (the 'special leave' test). 2. The application of an incorrect and more stringent test for leave to appeal by petition judges constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying reconsideration under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act. 3. Under s 17(2)(f), the determination of whether exceptional circumstances exist is a jurisdictional threshold question to be decided by the court to which the matter is referred for reconsideration, not by the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal (following Motsoeneng and Bidvest). 4. Leave to appeal may be granted on the basis of 'compelling reasons' under s 17(1)(b) where matters of significant public importance are at stake and there is substantial overlap with a pending appeal on the same issues, even in the absence of strong prospects of success on the merits. 5. The public interest in achieving certainty and avoiding inconsistent outcomes on substantively identical issues of law constitutes a compelling reason to grant leave to appeal.

The Court noted the ongoing jurisprudential debate regarding the interpretation of s 17(2)(f), referencing the minority judgment in Godloza v S which questioned the correctness of Motsoeneng and Bidvest. The Court observed that while minority judgments of the Constitutional Court have persuasive effect, they are not binding. The Court stated that until the holdings in Motsoeneng and Bidvest are reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal or overturned by the Constitutional Court, they remain binding authority. The Court acknowledged difficulties the Bidvest approach might present where the President refuses reconsideration, but noted this was not the issue before it. The Court also commented that but for the error of the petition judges, leave to appeal would likely have been granted at the very least on the basis of s 17(1)(b) given the public interest implicated.

This case is significant for clarifying the distinction between 'special leave to appeal' under s 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act (applicable to high court decisions on appeal) and 'ordinary leave to appeal' under s 17(1) (applicable to high court decisions sitting as a court of first instance). The judgment reinforces that applying the wrong test can constitute exceptional circumstances warranting reconsideration under s 17(2)(f). The case also demonstrates the importance of ensuring consistency in appellate decisions on overlapping issues of public importance, particularly in matters affecting statutory bodies like the RAF and numerous claimants. The judgment confirms the continued binding authority of Motsoeneng and Bidvest regarding who determines exceptional circumstances under s 17(2)(f), despite the minority view expressed in Godloza. It illustrates how courts should exercise their discretion to grant leave to appeal where compelling public interest considerations exist, even absent strong prospects of success on the merits.