1. Tapera Sengweni v The Law Society of Zimbabwe 2. Augustine Runesu Chizikani v The Law Society of Zimbabwe

Two separate applications for rescission of deregistration orders were heard together as they raised a common jurisdictional issue. In LPDT 3/13, Tapera Sengweni was ordered deregistered on 18 October 2013 after allegedly misappropriating US$14,500 of client funds collected on behalf of Nicholas Masuku. The deregistration order was granted after Sengweni, represented by Advocate Uriri, failed to honor an undertaking to pay the outstanding amount. Sengweni filed for rescission on 18 October 2018, claiming he was not served with the application and Advocate Uriri lacked instructions. In LPDT 8/18, Augustine Chizikani was ordered deregistered on 10 April 2019 for failing to account for funds collected in a debt collection matter for Southern Africa Media Development Fund and for failing to pay office rental. Chizikani did not attend the hearing on 10 April 2019 and filed for rescission on 20 May 2019. Both applicants sought rescission of the Tribunal's deregistration orders.

• Whether the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal has jurisdiction to rescind its own decisions
• Whether a statutory tribunal can exercise powers not conferred upon it by its enabling legislation
• Whether the Administrative Justice Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to rescind its decisions
• Whether the Tribunal has inherent or implied jurisdiction to regulate its own proceedings

Both applications for rescission dismissed with costs. Application for rescission under case number LPDT 8/18 (Chizikani) dismissed with costs. Application for rescission under case number LPDT 27/18 (Sengweni) dismissed with costs.

A statutory tribunal created by legislation is bound by the four corners of its enabling statute and possesses only those powers expressly conferred upon it by that statute. The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, as a creature of statute, has no inherent, implied, or derivative jurisdiction to rescind its own decisions where such power is not conferred by the Legal Practitioners Act. The Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body and does not constitute an 'administrative authority' as defined in the Administrative Justice Act, and therefore cannot derive jurisdiction from that Act to rescind its decisions.

The court noted the factual distinction between the two cases: Sengweni was represented by counsel who made concessions on his behalf, resulting in what appeared to be a consent order on the merits, whereas Chizikani was absent and the order was made after consideration of his counter-statement. Despite this distinction, the same jurisdictional defect applied to both applications. The court also observed that the proper forum for certain remedies (such as mandamus) is the High Court, not inferior tribunals. While not expressly stated, the court's reasoning suggests that parties affected by tribunal decisions who believe they have been denied natural justice should pursue appeals or review proceedings in the High Court rather than seeking rescission from the tribunal.

This case reinforces the fundamental principle in Zimbabwean law that statutory tribunals are creatures of statute with strictly limited jurisdiction. The judgment confirms that such tribunals cannot exercise powers not expressly conferred by their enabling legislation, including the power to rescind their own orders. This is significant for legal practice as it clarifies that parties aggrieved by tribunal decisions must seek remedies through the proper legal channels (such as appeal or review to the High Court) rather than seeking rescission from the tribunal itself. The case also clarifies that quasi-judicial bodies like the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal do not fall within the definition of 'administrative authority' under the Administrative Justice Act and therefore cannot derive jurisdiction from that statute.