Road Accident Fund and Others v Legal Practitioners' Indemnity Insurance Fund, NPC and Others

The Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 requires road accident victims to lodge claims on a prescribed RAF 1 form. For over a decade, the form prescribed in the 2008 regulations remained in force. In 2021, the RAF attempted to introduce more onerous requirements through management directives and Board Notice 58 of 2021, which the High Court interdicted in Mautla I. The RAF withdrew that notice and called for comments via Board Notice 66 of 2021. On 6 May 2022, the RAF published Board Notice 271 of 2022, imposing new mandatory terms, conditions and supporting documents for lodging claims, purportedly under regulation 7 of the 2008 regulations. On 4 July 2022, the Minister of Transport published Board Notice 302, prescribing the revised RAF 1 form under s 26 of the Act, effectively incorporating the RAF's more stringent requirements. The respondents launched review proceedings in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, which declared both board notices unlawful and set them aside, reverting to the 2008 form. The RAF appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, contending that the RAF 1 form was not administrative action and that the full court erred in its findings on the powers of the RAF and the Minister.

• Whether the Minister's decision to gazette the revised RAF 1 form (Board Notice 302) constituted administrative action reviewable under PAJA
• Whether Board Notice 271 of 2022 issued by the RAF constituted the making of regulations and unlawfully encroached on the Minister's powers under ss 24 and 26 of the RAF Act
• Whether the Minister's decision complied with the procedural fairness requirements of s 4(1) of PAJA
• Whether the Minister acted rationally, for a proper purpose, and in accordance with the objects of the Act in prescribing the revised form
• Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside both board notices and reverting to the 2008 RAF 1 form

The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed. The date in paragraph (vii) of the High Court order was amended to 30 September 2026. The High Court's orders setting aside Board Notice 271 of 2022 and Board Notice 302 of 2022, and reverting to the 2008 RAF 1 form, were upheld.

1) The power to prescribe the RAF 1 claim form resides with the Minister of Transport under s 26 of the RAF Act (regulation-making power), and the RAF's powers under s 4 are confined to administering claims and do not include prescribing the form's content or making regulations. 2) The making of regulations by a Minister, where they adversely affect rights and have direct external legal effect, constitutes administrative action under PAJA. 3) Ministerial regulation-making affecting the rights of the public must comply with the procedural fairness requirements of PAJA, including public enquiry and/or notice and comment procedures under s 4(1). 4) An administrative decision is unlawful if taken for an ulterior motive, on the unwarranted dictates of another body, or without regard to relevant statutory considerations (s 26's requirement that regulations be necessary or expedient to achieve the Act's object). 5) A board notice that is expressly contingent upon a ministerial regulation has no independent legal existence and falls when the regulation is set aside.

The Court observed that it was of little consequence whether the Minister's decision was set aside under PAJA or on the principle of legality, since the exercise of public power is reviewable under both. The Court noted, without affecting the outcome, that the full court had been factually incorrect about the procedural history of Mautla II but that nothing turned on it. The Court also acknowledged the RAF's complaints about operational backlogs allegedly caused by the 'skeletal' 2008 form, but left the High Court's tailored remedial order intact. Additionally, the Court referred to the principle of substantial compliance with RAF 1 form requirements and the directory nature of ss 24(1)(a) and (4) as reinforcing why the more stringent regulation was counter to the Act's purpose.

The judgment is significant in South African administrative and RAF law as it affirms that the Minister of Transport alone holds the power to prescribe the RAF 1 claim form under s 26 of the RAF Act, and that the RAF's administrative powers under s 4 do not extend to making regulations or dictating the content of the statutory claim form. It confirms that delegated legislation by a Minister is administrative action subject to review under PAJA, including the procedural fairness requirements of s 4 where public rights are affected. The judgment protects the social-security object of the RAF Act by preventing the imposition of overly burdensome documentary requirements that impede access to compensation, and reinforces that ministerial decision-making cannot amount to rubber-stamping the dictates of another body.