Plaatjies v Melomed Private Hospitals t/a Gatesville Private Hospital and Another

The plaintiff, a police officer, sustained a gunshot wound on duty and was admitted to the first defendant hospital on 4 August 2016. He was assessed by the second defendant, Dr Ddamulira, who allegedly assured him the bullet had gone 'straight through' after a cursory examination. The plaintiff developed complications including septicaemia, kidney failure, and intestinal damage, requiring multiple surgeries between 5 August and 1 September 2016, and was sedated until 18 August 2016. He was discharged on 23 September 2016. On 20 June 2017, the plaintiff consulted Dr Ddamulira again and was diagnosed with an incisional hernia, which was surgically repaired on 6 July 2017. Further consultations and another hernia repair occurred in May 2018. The plaintiff instituted a medical negligence claim against the hospital only on 28 March 2019. Dr Ddamulira was joined as second defendant on 14 April 2021, and amended particulars were delivered on 3 May 2021.

• Whether the plaintiff's claim against the second defendant had prescribed in terms of section 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.
• When the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the identity of the debtor and the facts from which the debt arises for purposes of section 12(3).
• Whether knowledge of the employment status of the defendant (independent contractor versus employee) constitutes 'knowledge of the identity of the debtor' or 'facts from which the debt arises'.
• Whether information suggesting negligence constitutes 'facts from which the debt arises' or is merely a legal conclusion.

The second defendant's special plea of prescription was upheld. The plaintiff's claim against the second defendant was dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.

For purposes of section 12(3) of the Prescription Act, a delictual debt is due once the creditor has knowledge of the material facts (facta probanda) necessary to establish liability, not of the legal conclusions such as negligence or wrongfulness. Knowledge of a debtor's employment status relates to the right to sue, not to the material facts from which the debt arises, and does not postpone the running of prescription. Furthermore, prescription is not postponed until a creditor becomes aware of the full extent of their legal rights. A creditor is deemed to have the requisite knowledge if they could have acquired it by exercising reasonable care, and the standard of reasonable care is higher for a creditor represented by legal practitioners.

The court expressed concern that the joinder of Dr Ddamulira was granted based on false or incorrect averments made by an officer of the court, which had not been rectified. The court noted that it would result in injustice if the claim against Dr Ddamulira were permitted to continue in these circumstances. The court also commented on the failure of the plaintiff's legal representatives to explain why the 2019 claim was not instituted against the hospital and its employees on a jointly and severally liable basis, describing this as an unexplained omission.

This judgment clarifies the application of section 12(3) of the Prescription Act in medical negligence claims, particularly regarding the distinction between knowledge of material facts (facta probanda) and knowledge of legal conclusions (negligence, wrongfulness) or the right to sue. It confirms that a plaintiff's erroneous assumption about a doctor's employment status does not delay prescription, and that the duty to exercise reasonable care extends to a litigant's legal representatives. The case also underscores the principle that subsequent complications flowing from initial treatment are facta probantia and not new material facts that restart prescription.