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Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited with approval for test to determine whether a right is real as opposed to personal.
Cited for test distinguishing real from personal rights.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited to support the dictionary definition of 'debt' adopted in Makate.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited for discussion on the history of registration of immovable property in South Africa and for explanation of real security in property.
Court applies Makate's constitutional issue regarding prescription as bar to access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution and its dictionary…
Cited to explain the doctrine of notice regarding personal rights.
Cited for proposition that an arguable point of law of general public importance can provide a basis for this Court's jurisdiction.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Applied to explain that a mortgage bond is always accessory to an obligation and if the obligation is unenforceable the security is unenforceable too.
Applied for the test of whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.
Cited as example that it is generally not in the interests of justice to grant leave where there are no reasonable prospects of success on the merits.
Cited for proposition that real rights give rise to competencies, not correlative personal obligations.
Applied to state the two-part test for determining whether a right is real as opposed to personal.