Nemangwela v Road Accident Fund

On 4 November 2016, Ms Ndidzulafhi Nemangwela was knocked down by a Hyster 250 forklift driven by Mr Mashudu Tshishonga at her workplace at Nzhelele Spar in the Vhembe district, Limpopo. She was a merchandiser for Sasko working inside the Spar premises. The collision occurred at approximately 06h45 at the receiving bay inside the Spar premises when the forklift was reversing. The forklift drove over her leg, causing injuries that required hospitalization. The forklift was generally used to carry loads within the Nzhelele Spar premises, specifically for loading and offloading goods from the receiving area to the store. The Hyster 250 forklift was equipped with a diesel engine, battery, one driver's seat, accelerator, brake pedal, steering wheel, lights, indicators and a hooter, but no speedometer, brake lights or mirrors. It had rear wheel steering and loading gear at the front. The driver testified he was licensed and trained to operate the forklift and was specifically instructed not to drive it on the main road. Ms Nemangwela instituted an action against the RAF for damages. The RAF conceded merits at 80/20% in her favour, conditional on the court finding that the forklift was a motor vehicle.

• Whether a Hyster 250 forklift qualifies as a 'motor vehicle' as defined in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
• Whether a vehicle used primarily on private premises for loading and offloading goods is 'designed or adapted for propulsion or haulage on a road' within the meaning of the RAF Act
• The proper interpretation of 'motor vehicle' and 'road' in the context of the RAF Act
• Whether the definition of 'motor vehicle' should be harmonized with the National Road Traffic Act through constitutional interpretation

The appeal was dismissed. Each party was ordered to pay its own costs.

A Hyster 250 forklift is not a 'motor vehicle' as defined in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. For a vehicle to qualify as a motor vehicle under the RAF Act, it must be designed or adapted for propulsion or haulage on a road. The test is objective: whether the vehicle's design and primary purpose is for use on roads. The fact that a vehicle can be used on a road does not mean it was designed for propulsion on a road. The purpose of a forklift is to lift, load and transport goods in commercial premises; the fact that it can travel is incidental to this purpose. Where a vehicle's use on a road would be ordinarily difficult and inherently potentially hazardous to its operator and other road users, it cannot be said to be a motor vehicle within the meaning of the definition. A receiving area in a private commercial premises used only for loading goods is not a 'road' for purposes of the RAF Act. The word 'road' in the RAF Act bears its ordinary meaning of a wide way leading from one place to another used by vehicles, and in this context refers to roads used by the general public, not private loading areas.

The Court noted obiter that in RAF v Mbendera, it was observed that the purposes of forklifts, cranes, lawnmowers and mobile power units are very different from trucks designed for road haulage, and that the fact such equipment can travel on a road is incidental to their purpose. The Court also commented obiter that developing the common law to harmonize the RAF Act definition with the National Road Traffic Act through section 39(2) of the Constitution would have far-reaching consequences for numerous government departments and private bodies like insurance companies who had not been invited as parties, and was therefore not merited in this case. The Court further observed that the appellant's conduct in pursuing an issue raised for the first time at trial (and not properly pleaded) could not be said to constitute an abuse of court process, which justified the order that each party bear its own costs rather than costs following the result.

This case provides important clarification on the definition of 'motor vehicle' under the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. It confirms that the critical test is whether a vehicle is designed for propulsion on a road, not merely whether it can travel on a road. The judgment reinforces the principle from Chauke v Santam Ltd that forklifts used primarily for loading and offloading in private commercial premises do not qualify as motor vehicles under the RAF Act, even if they have some road-going features like lights and indicators. The case distinguishes industrial vehicles like forklifts (whose purpose is lifting/loading with incidental mobility) from vehicles like Reach Stackers that are designed for road use. It confirms that the RAF's liability does not extend to accidents involving industrial equipment in private workplaces, even where such equipment has some vehicle-like features. The case also illustrates the limits of constitutional interpretation in statutory cases where fundamental changes to liability would affect parties not before the court. It provides guidance on the practical application of the RAF Act in workplace settings and clarifies the boundaries of the RAF's compensatory scheme.