Chido Matewa v Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company (ZETDC)

The plaintiff, a commercial farmer at Dagbreek farm in Nyazura, sued the defendant (a subsidiary of ZESA Holdings) for US$500,000 for loss of 30 hectares of tobacco and 20 hectares of sugar beans crops, plus US$200,000 for consequential loss. The plaintiff alleged that in October 2009, the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully confiscated electrical equipment from her farm (meter boxes, cables, MCBs and other electrical gadgets). Following an investigation in January 2010, the defendant allegedly undertook to reinstate electricity upon realizing the plaintiff needed it to irrigate her crops, and advised her to continue farming activities as installation was imminent. However, the defendant failed to install electricity, resulting in crops wilting due to moisture stress.

• Whether the plaintiff's declaration disclosed a cause of action
• Whether the pleading was excipiable for failing to specify whether the claim arose from contractual or delictual obligations
• Whether the plaintiff's averments of wrongful and unlawful conduct were sufficient to found a cause of action
• The proper approach to determining whether a pleading is excipiable

The exception was dismissed with costs against the defendant.

A pleading is only excipiable on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action if no possible evidence led on that pleading can disclose such cause of action. Courts should not examine pleadings with excessive scrutiny or a "magnifying glass of too high power." Where a declaration contains averments of wrongful and unlawful conduct and an undertaking that, if proven by evidence, could establish a cause of action, the pleading is not excipiable merely because it does not explicitly specify whether the claim is contractual or delictual in nature. Pleadings must state relevant facts, not evidence, and should be assessed to determine whether they inform parties of the issues, enable them to know what case to meet, and assist the court in defining the limits of the action.

The court made critical observations about the increasing prevalence of merit-less exceptions in Zimbabwean courts that appear designed to delay proceedings rather than serve legitimate procedural purposes. Mathonsi J noted that excipients frequently and improperly pray for dismissal of claims when the appropriate remedy, even if an exception were upheld, would be to direct amendment of the impugned pleading. The court stated that such ill-conceived exceptions unnecessarily put plaintiffs out of pocket and should face cost consequences. The court also noted, without deciding, that there was an objection that the exception was not taken in accordance with Rule 140(1)(b) of the High Court Rules 1971 (failure to write a letter of complaint to address the pleading defect), but found it unnecessary to address this objection given the substantive dismissal of the exception.

This case reinforces important principles in Zimbabwean civil procedure regarding the proper approach to exceptions and pleadings. It emphasizes that courts should not scrutinize pleadings with excessive technicality, and that exceptions should only be taken where they serve to settle matters economically or prevent serious embarrassment. The judgment serves as a caution against using exceptions as delaying tactics, and confirms that the test for whether a pleading discloses a cause of action is whether any possible evidence could establish such cause of action. It also clarifies that even successful exceptions should result in amendment rather than dismissal of claims, making the defendant's prayer for dismissal inappropriate.