Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others

Six applicants were tenants living in Ennerdale Mansions, a 44-apartment building owned by Mr. Thomas Nel (the fourth respondent). City Power disconnected the electricity supply to the building on 8 July 2008 without prior notice to the tenants. The disconnection was due to Mr. Nel owing approximately R400,000 in arrears to City Power. The applicants had been paying their electricity bills to the landlord and were not in arrears. Approximately 30 families, including 38 children and elderly persons, were affected. The applicants had no contractual relationship with City Power - Mr. Nel held the electricity supply contract. The applicants sought reconnection of electricity and a declaration that they were entitled to procedural fairness before termination. The High Court dismissed their application, finding the applicants had no rights that were affected. The applicants remained without electricity for over 12 months.

• Whether tenants who have no contractual relationship with a municipal electricity service provider are entitled to procedural fairness under section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) before their electricity supply is terminated
• Whether the termination of electricity supply to the applicants constituted administrative action that had a 'direct, external legal effect' on them
• Whether any 'rights' of the applicants were 'materially and adversely affected' for the purposes of section 3 of PAJA
• The proper interpretation of 'rights' under section 3(1) of PAJA
• Whether the Electricity By-laws were impliedly repealed by the Credit Control By-laws
• The constitutional validity of by-law 14(1) of the Electricity By-laws and by-law 15 of the Credit Control By-laws
• The content of procedural fairness required in the circumstances

1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal upheld and order of the High Court set aside. 3. Termination of electricity supply to Ennerdale Mansions on 8 July 2008 declared unlawful. 4. Respondents ordered to reconnect electricity supply to Ennerdale Mansions forthwith. 5. The words 'without notice' in by-law 14(1) of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council: Standardisation of Electricity By-laws declared unconstitutional and invalid and severed from by-law 14(1). 6. Respondents ordered to pay costs of applicants in both the High Court and Constitutional Court, including costs of two counsel.

1. When a municipality supplies electricity to a building, it does so in fulfillment of constitutional and statutory duties to provide basic municipal services to all persons in its jurisdiction. Recipients of such services have a corresponding public law right to receive the service. 2. The termination of electricity supply by a municipality constitutes administrative action that materially and adversely affects the rights of users of that service, even where those users have no contractual relationship with the service provider. 3. For purposes of section 3(1) of PAJA, 'rights' must be interpreted purposively and broadly to include not only vested private law rights but also legal entitlements that have their basis in constitutional and statutory obligations of government. 4. Persons whose rights are materially and adversely affected by the termination of a basic municipal service are entitled to procedural fairness under section 3 of PAJA, including adequate notice of the proposed termination and an opportunity to make representations. 5. Administrative efficiency concerns primarily inform the content of procedural fairness duties rather than the scope of administrative law's application. 6. By-law provisions that permit termination of municipal services 'without notice' are inconsistent with section 33(1) of the Constitution and section 3(2)(b) of PAJA. 7. Where municipal by-laws are capable of being read consistently with PAJA and the Constitution, they should be so interpreted. The word 'may' in by-law provisions can be read as 'must' where this produces a constitutional result and is consistent with PAJA's requirements.

1. Skweyiya J observed that it was not necessary to determine whether the termination constituted a retrogressive measure violating the section 26 right of access to adequate housing, nor whether the right to human dignity under section 10 was affected as a self-standing right. 2. The Court noted that the broader question of whether the effect and reach of the debt-collection policy informing the Credit Control By-laws is justifiable (particularly the general practice of disconnecting a user's electricity to recover debt from someone else) was not challenged in this case and remains open to future challenge. 3. The Court noted that it might be appropriate for City Power and the applicants to explore alternative arrangements such as direct billing at the pre-termination stage, and that the Credit Control By-laws do not appear to prohibit such arrangements before termination. 4. Skweyiya J observed that 'rights entail responsibilities' and that citizens who can pay must take responsibility for paying for services provided by government. 5. The Court emphasized that the judgment should not be taken as failing to appreciate the importance of debt collection by local government, noting that municipalities bear important constitutional obligations to recover debt efficiently. 6. The Court referred to the national policy of Batho Pele ('People First') as giving practical expression to the constitutional value of ubuntu in the context of public service delivery, noting that the terms 'citizen' and 'customer' are interchangeable in this context. 7. Skweyiya J noted that City Power's use of the applicants as leverage for payment of Mr. Nel's debts was 'both ineffective and unjust', and that affording procedural fairness would have had no negative effect on City Power's ability to collect the debt from Mr. Nel.

This case is significant in South African law for several reasons: 1. It affirms that users of basic municipal services have public law rights to receive those services based on constitutional and statutory obligations of local government, independent of any contractual relationship with the service provider. 2. It establishes an expanded understanding of 'rights' under section 3(1) of PAJA that extends beyond private law rights to include legal entitlements arising from constitutional and statutory obligations of government. 3. It places procedural fairness at the center of the relationship between municipalities and residents, even where no formal contractual relationship exists. 4. It recognizes electricity as a basic municipal service that is 'virtually indispensable' in urban society. 5. It demonstrates how administrative law principles operate to govern relations between public service providers and citizens beyond the law of contract. 6. It balances the need for municipal debt collection with the procedural rights of service users, finding that affording procedural fairness does not undermine legitimate debt collection efforts. 7. It provides practical guidance on the content of procedural fairness in service termination contexts, requiring at least 14 days' pre-termination notice. 8. It illustrates the Court's approach to reading statutory provisions consistently with PAJA and the Constitution where possible, rather than declaring invalidity. The case is an important affirmation of administrative justice in the context of municipal service delivery and the constitutional obligations of local government.