Urgenda Foundation, a citizens' platform working on climate change prevention, brought a claim against the State of the Netherlands seeking an order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by end-2020 relative to 1990 levels. The case was based on scientific consensus that global warming must be limited to below 2°C (and ideally 1.5°C) to prevent dangerous climate change. The IPCC AR4 report (2007) concluded that Annex I countries (including the Netherlands) needed to reduce emissions by 25-40% by 2020 to achieve the 450 ppm scenario necessary for the 2°C target. The Netherlands had initially committed to a 30% reduction by 2020, but later reduced this target to 20% (in line with EU commitments). By 2017, Dutch emissions had only declined by 13% relative to 1990. The State projected achieving 14-17% reduction by 2020 (later revised to 23% with a margin of 19-27% due to new calculation methods). The Netherlands has one of the highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions globally, with CO2 representing 85% of its total emissions, largely from the energy sector.
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of The Hague District Court of 24 June 2015. The State was ordered to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by end-2020 relative to 1990 levels. The State was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings (€711 in court fees, €16,503 in attorney fees for the main appeal, and €8,256 in attorney fees for the cross-appeal), with statutory interest payable if not paid within fourteen days. The judgment was declared provisionally enforceable.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights impose positive obligations on states to take concrete measures to protect against real and imminent threats from dangerous climate change; (2) This duty of care requires states to take precautionary measures to prevent future infringements of the right to life and private/family life, even where full scientific certainty is lacking; (3) The positive obligation is triggered when the government knows or ought to have known of a real and imminent threat that could endanger protected rights; (4) The duty to prevent dangerous climate change applies to each individual state within its territory and capabilities, notwithstanding the global nature of the problem; (5) Courts have jurisdiction to enforce these human rights obligations by ordering states to achieve specific emission reduction targets, provided the state retains freedom in choosing how to comply; (6) The doctrine of separation of powers (trias politica) does not prevent judicial enforcement of directly effective treaty provisions with binding obligations; (7) A margin of appreciation exists regarding the choice of measures, but not regarding whether to act when faced with established serious risks; (8) The precautionary principle requires action where there are plausible serious risks, even absent complete scientific certainty; (9) Economic considerations, international competitiveness concerns, and the relative smallness of a country's absolute emissions do not override fundamental human rights protection duties; (10) EU law (Article 193 TFEU) permits Member States to adopt more stringent environmental protection measures than EU minimum standards, provided they are compatible with the Treaties.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) The 2°C target may not be sufficiently safe, and the 1.5°C target recognized in the Paris Agreement is more appropriate for protecting against dangerous climate change; (2) The AR5 IPCC scenarios relying on negative emission technologies (NETs) are not realistic given current technological limitations, making AR4's 25-40% reduction target for 2020 more reliable; (3) A 25% reduction should be considered a minimum, and more ambitious targets aligned with the 1.5°C goal may be necessary; (4) The Netherlands' retrospective adjustment of 1990 baseline emissions upward (making percentage reductions appear better) does not improve the actual climate situation and may obscure the true extent of the problem; (5) Even distribution of reduction efforts over time would suggest substantially higher than 20% reduction by 2020 given the 49% target for 2030; (6) Delaying reduction efforts increases total cumulative emissions, uses up the carbon budget faster, and makes later action more expensive, difficult and risky; (7) The Netherlands, as a highly developed Annex I country with high historical and per capita emissions, has particular responsibility to lead on climate action; (8) Adaptation measures, while important, cannot substitute for emission reduction (mitigation) and cannot adequately prevent potentially disastrous consequences of excessive global warming; (9) The margin of uncertainty (19-27%) in projected reductions is unacceptable given the seriousness of the threats involved.
This landmark climate change judgment is one of the first in the world to successfully compel a government to take more ambitious climate action based on human rights obligations. It establishes that: (1) Articles 2 and 8 ECHR create enforceable positive duties to protect against climate change threats; (2) Courts can order governments to take climate action without violating separation of powers; (3) The global nature of climate change does not absolve individual states of responsibility; (4) Scientific consensus (particularly IPCC reports) can establish the standard of care required; (5) The precautionary principle applies to climate action; (6) NGOs have standing to bring climate litigation on behalf of citizens; (7) Economic concerns and international coordination challenges do not override fundamental human rights duties. The case has inspired similar climate litigation worldwide and demonstrates judicial willingness to enforce science-based climate targets against government inaction. It represents a significant development in environmental constitutionalism and the justiciability of climate change. While this is a Dutch case, it has been widely cited and studied internationally, including in South Africa, as a model for rights-based climate litigation.