The Minister of Police and Another v Ramabanta

The respondent, Mr Khotso Julius Ramabanta, was arrested on 27 February 2019 and detained until 20 March 2019, when charges against him were withdrawn by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). He instituted action for damages against the Minister of Police and the NDPP arising from the arrest and detention. The trial court dismissed the claims, finding the arrest lawful under s 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and finding no evidence of malicious prosecution. The full court of the Free State Division, Bloemfontein, upheld an appeal and awarded R70,000 against the Minister and R650,000 against the NDPP. The NDPP petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal for special leave to appeal, which was dismissed by two judges. The NDPP then applied to the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal for reconsideration and variation of the dismissal under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The President referred the matter for oral argument.

• Whether exceptional circumstances existed to warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of a petition for special leave to appeal under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
• Whether the full court misapplied legal principles governing malicious prosecution
• Whether the damages award of R650,000 was disproportionate to comparable cases

The application for reconsideration in terms of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.

The binding legal principle is that for a reconsideration application under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act to succeed, an applicant must demonstrate 'exceptional circumstances' - meaning circumstances that are truly exceptional, markedly unusual, or such that a grave failure of justice would otherwise result or the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. Mere dissatisfaction with a decision, perceived prospects of success on appeal, or arguments rehearsing the merits already considered and rejected do not constitute exceptional circumstances. The provision is a safeguard against manifest injustice, not a parallel appeal process affording litigants additional opportunities to pursue relief already refused. The President's power under s 17(2)(f) is limited to referral for reconsideration; the final decision rests with the court (at least two judges), not the President alone.

The court made several observations regarding the substantive issues in the underlying case, though these were not determinative of the reconsideration application. The court noted that the full court's findings on malicious prosecution were based on proper assessment of the prosecutor's conduct, including lack of reasonable and probable cause and belated withdrawal of charges undermining claims of good faith. Regarding damages, the court observed that while the R650,000 award was substantial, it was not so disproportionate when compared to cases like De Klerk v Minister of Police (R300,000 for seven days' detention) and Motladile v Minister of Police (R200,000 for five days' detention) as to suggest manifest injustice. The court distinguished cases relied upon by the NDPP such as Tyulu (R15,000) and Seymour (R90,000) as involving shorter detentions and less severe consequences than Mr Ramabanta's 22-day detention. The court also noted that neither counsel referred it to recent decisions on the issue of exceptional circumstances, though counsel accepted the onus of establishing such circumstances.

This case reinforces the stringent threshold for reconsideration applications under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act. It clarifies that the provision is an extraordinary remedy requiring 'exceptional circumstances', not merely disagreement with a previous decision or perceived prospects of success on appeal. The judgment emphasizes that reconsideration is a safeguard against manifest injustice, not a routine second chance or parallel appeal process. It also clarifies the limited procedural role of the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal in such matters - merely to refer for reconsideration, not to make the final decision. The case provides guidance on what does not constitute exceptional circumstances: rehearsing arguments already considered and rejected, arguing the merits of the underlying appeal, or asserting errors in law or fact assessment without demonstrating grave injustice. It reinforces that the provision is intended to prevent injustice in truly exceptional cases, such as where new evidence emerges or a manifest error occurred that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.