Annandale v Meintjes and Meintjes Rekenmeesters CC and Another

The applicant, Ms Annandale, is an accountant who in June 2015 concluded an oral agreement with the first respondent accounting practice (Meintjes & Meintjes) following the death of its sole member, Mr Meintjes, in April 2015. The terms of the oral agreement were disputed. The practice, represented by the late Mr Meintjes' widow (who was not an accountant), contended that Ms Annandale would work as a sub-contractor entitled to one-third of net profits, with two-thirds allocated to the practice. Ms Annandale contended she agreed to take over the entire defunct practice in exchange for concluding outstanding professional work valued at R218 000. Ms Annandale worked for the practice from June 2015 to July 2017, when the widow discovered that Ms Annandale had transferred the practice's trust account into her own name and created a new E-filing profile. The practice alleged Ms Annandale owed it R2 110 772 based on accumulated net profit of R3 166 158. The practice sought an order for an independent audit and repayment of two-thirds of income after expenses. The high court referred the matter for oral evidence on the disputed agreement, rejected Ms Annandale's evidence as improbable, and granted the relief sought. The full court dismissed Ms Annandale's appeal (with one dissenting judge). Ms Annandale's petition for special leave to the Supreme Court of Appeal was refused. She then applied for reconsideration under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act, which the President referred to the Court.

• Whether exceptional circumstances existed to warrant reconsideration under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 of a decision refusing special leave to appeal
• What constitutes 'exceptional circumstances' in the context of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act
• Whether the personal and financial hardship faced by a litigant constitutes exceptional circumstances
• Whether a split decision in the full court constitutes an exceptional circumstance
• Whether prospects of success alone constitute exceptional circumstances

1. The matter is struck from the roll. 2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the application for reconsideration.

In the context of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, 'exceptional circumstances' must involve something out of the ordinary, uncommon, rare or different - something which is excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply to it. The provision is not intended to afford disappointed litigants a further opportunity to secure relief already refused. An application that merely rehearses arguments already made, considered and rejected will not succeed, unless it is strongly arguable that justice will be denied without the possibility of an appeal. Personal financial hardship, adverse credibility findings in lower courts, and split decisions in the full court do not, without more, constitute exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances must involve more than satisfying the requirements for special leave to appeal. The power under s 17(2)(f) is likely to be exercised only when the President believes that some matter of importance has possibly been overlooked or grave injustice will otherwise result. In the absence of exceptional circumstances as a jurisdictional fact, an application for reconsideration must be struck from the roll.

The Court made obiter observations on the prospects of success in the underlying appeal, noting that while prospects of success alone do not constitute exceptional circumstances, they may be relevant. The Court observed that the high court and full court correctly applied the principles in Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell et Cie and Others 2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA) in evaluating the mutually destructive versions of the parties. There were immaterial contradictions in the practice's version, but the witnesses corroborated each other and were truthful. Ms Annandale's evidence was replete with contradictions and obvious improbabilities. There was no misdirection by the high court or majority of the full court in accepting the practice's version. The Court also made reference to the principle of ubuntu raised by Ms Annandale, but did not find it applicable to establish exceptional circumstances in this context, noting that while the appeal may be important to the parties personally, it raises nothing of public importance warranting special attention. The Court acknowledged the diversity in personal circumstances of litigants but emphasized that such personal impact, without more, does not create exceptional circumstances for purposes of s 17(2)(f).

This case provides important guidance on the interpretation and application of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which allows the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal to refer a decision refusing special leave to appeal for reconsideration in 'exceptional circumstances'. The judgment clarifies that: (1) exceptional circumstances require something out of the ordinary, uncommon, rare or different; (2) the provision is not a mechanism for disappointed litigants to have a second attempt at arguments already considered and rejected; (3) personal financial hardship, adverse credibility findings, and split decisions in lower courts do not, without more, constitute exceptional circumstances; (4) exceptional circumstances must involve more than merely satisfying the requirements for special leave to appeal; (5) the power is intended to deal with situations where injustice might otherwise result, not to provide routine review of petition decisions. The case reinforces the high threshold for invoking s 17(2)(f) and protects the finality of decisions on petitions for special leave to appeal. It also illustrates the application of the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery principles for resolving disputes of fact involving mutually destructive versions.