The applicant was employed by the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) in 2008 as an Assistant Training and Professional Development Officer, working under the supervision of the 3rd respondent. On 7 October 2020, she submitted a letter of resignation praising her employer, with her last day to be 31 December 2020. After discussions with the Personnel Officer, she attempted to withdraw her resignation but learned that management had accepted it on 15 October 2020. She then absented herself from work from 16-23 October 2020. On 13 November 2020, through her lawyers, she filed a formal complaint against the 3rd respondent alleging egregious misconduct, sexual harassment, and violations of her labour rights, claiming her resignation was constructive dismissal. She sought withdrawal of her resignation and requested the ZMC to investigate and suspend the 3rd respondent. The applicant brought the matter before the High Court seeking declaratory orders that the 1st and 2nd respondents violated their constitutional obligations under sections 233, 235, and 249 of the Constitution by failing to investigate her complaint.
The application was dismissed with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale (attorney-client scale).
For a matter to constitute a constitutional application under section 85(1) of the Constitution, the applicant must specifically identify a fundamental right or freedom in Chapter 4 (Bill of Rights) that has been violated and demonstrate how it was violated. Courts must examine the substance and true intention of an application rather than merely its form. A labour dispute cannot be converted into a constitutional matter simply by invoking constitutional provisions when the real objective is reinstatement or resolution of employment-related grievances. The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to hear labour disputes under section 89(6) of the Labour Act. Applications for mandamus seeking to compel performance of constitutional obligations must be properly founded on actual constitutional violations, not disguised labour grievances.
The court observed that the relief sought was couched in an unusual way that prescribed what the respondents ought to do in mounting investigations, including ordering suspension of the 3rd respondent, which would usurp the functions of an administrative body. The court commented that it discharges judicial functions and is not expected to run as a commission of inquiry. The court noted that had the applicant succeeded in being reinstated, the present application would not have arisen, demonstrating the true labour nature of the dispute. The judge also observed that the applicant demonstrated herself to be well-informed and someone who would not sit docile while her rights were being trampled on, suggesting she knew the proper procedures but chose to circumvent them.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean (not South African) jurisprudence as it clarifies the distinction between labour disputes and constitutional matters. It establishes that courts will examine the substance and true intention of an application rather than merely its form, and that litigants cannot circumvent proper jurisdiction by cloaking labour disputes as constitutional matters. The judgment reinforces that for a matter to qualify as constitutional under section 85(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution, an applicant must specifically identify which fundamental right in Chapter 4 (Bill of Rights) has been violated and explain how. It also clarifies the respective jurisdictions and functions of independent commissions established under the Constitution. The award of costs on an attorney-client scale signals the court's disapproval of vexatious proceedings brought in the wrong forum.