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Cited to underscore the importance of avoiding a narrowly textual and legalistic approach.
Cited to explain that interpreting statutes within the context of the Constitution requires favouring compliance without distorting language beyond what words…
Cited for the interpretive approach that 'may' can be read as 'must' in accordance with PAJA to produce a constitutional result.
Court cites this case to discuss the interpretation of permissive ('may') versus mandatory ('shall') language in statutes, emphasising that 'may' can be…
Cited for the interpretation that the word 'may' in a statute confers discretion on a decision-maker.
Cited for the principle that the word 'may' in legislation does not necessarily imply 'must' by default.
Applied to show that the word 'may' can be construed in two ways: either as a complete discretion or as a power coupled with a duty.
Court cites this case in relation to instances where the word 'may' has been interpreted to mean 'must'.
Cited for the principle that the word 'may' confers a discretion and does not mean 'must'.
Cited for the principle that interpreting statutes within the context of the Constitution requires that language be interpreted, without undue strain, to…
The Constitutional Court emphasized that a purposive approach to interpretation does not give a court licence to distort the ordinary meaning of words beyond…
Cited for the principle that the interpretive process is limited to what the text is reasonably capable of meaning.
The court applies this Constitutional Court decision for the principle that the adoption of a purposive approach renders obsolete the inquiry into whether a…
Cited for the principle that courts have a constitutional duty to assist organs of state to ensure observance of constitutional values.
Cited for the importance of interpretation in the context of a constitutional democracy, noting legislation must be read with a mind to its role in the value…