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South African Law • Jurisdictional Corpus
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Moipone Moroka v Premier of the Free State Province and Others

Citation(295/2020) [2022] ZASCA 34 (31 March 2022)
JurisdictionZA
Area of Law
Customary LawAdministrative Law
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Traditional Leadership

Facts of the Case

This case concerned a dispute over the senior traditional leadership of Barolong Boo Seleka. The traditional leadership historically vested in Tshipinare's lineage from the 1880s until the death of Kgosi Ramokgopa Moroka in 2011. After Kgosi Ramokgopa's death, the royal family identified Kgosana Gaopalelwe Moroka as successor. After his death in 2013, rival factions emerged - one supporting the appellant Ms Moipone Moroka, the other supporting the late Kingsley Sehunelo Moroka. The Premier referred the dispute to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (the Commission) on 18 March 2014 for investigation. The Commission investigated and recommended that the rightful ruling house was the house of Setilo (descendants of Ramantshi Richard), effectively removing leadership from Tshipinare's lineage that had ruled since the 1880s. The Premier accepted the Commission's findings and recognized Kingsley Moroka as senior traditional leader. The appellant challenged this decision through review proceedings.

Legal Issues

  • Whether the Premier contravened section 21(2)(b) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 by referring the dispute to the Commission before the Free State House of Traditional Leaders could deal with the dispute
  • Whether the Commission had authority to investigate and make recommendations in respect of a dispute which arose after 1 September 1927 in terms of s 25(2)(viii) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act 23 of 2009
  • Whether the Commission had authority to deal with the dispute which was submitted to it more than six months after the date of coming into operation of the Amendment Act (1 February 2010), contrary to s 25(5)
  • Whether the appeal had become moot following the death of the sixth respondent
  • Whether the court could entertain a new point of law raised for the first time on appeal
  • Whether parties' consent or acquiescence could confer jurisdiction on the Commission where it lacked statutory authority

Judicial Outcome

The appeal was upheld with costs. The findings and recommendations of the Commission concerning the senior traditional leadership position of the Barolong Boo Seleka published on 29 February 2016 were reviewed and set aside. The decision of the Premier of the Free State Province accepting the findings and recommendations of the Commission was reviewed and set aside. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

A statutory body established by legislation can only exercise powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by its empowering legislation. Where a statute provides that a body "may not" deal with matters submitted after a specified time period, this constitutes an express prohibition and not a discretionary power - the phrase "may not" means the body has no authority to act. No organ of state or public official may act contrary to or beyond the scope of their powers as laid down in law (the doctrine of legality). Parties' consent or acquiescence cannot confer jurisdiction or legal competence on a statutory body where the statute expressly prohibits it from acting - this would violate the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. In the context of s 25(5) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act 23 of 2009, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims had no authority to investigate and make recommendations on disputes submitted to it more than six months after chapter 6 came into operation (1 February 2010).

Obiter Dicta

The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The majority commented that nothing turned on the initial failure to refer the dispute to the House since the Premier substantially complied with s 21(2)(a) when the House was eventually consulted and endorsed the referral to the Commission. (2) The majority observed that the Commission itself had posed but failed to answer the important question: "can the chieftainship be reversed and, if so, after how long?" This was particularly significant given that the Commission's recommendation would wrest traditional leadership from a lineage that had ruled since the 1880s. (3) The court noted the significance that the Commission is no longer in existence, which affected considerations of prejudice and the practical implications of the judgment. (4) Petse AP emphasized that the word "may" in statutory provisions can, depending on text, context and purpose, be interpreted to mean "must", citing Van Rooyen v The State and other Constitutional Court authority. (5) The court observed that while the dispute arose in 2011 (not before 1927), this did not assist the respondents because the Commission still lacked authority under s 25(5) based on when the dispute was submitted to it. (6) The majority commented on principles governing when new points of law may be raised on appeal, noting that such points must be apparent from the record and should not occasion unfairness to the parties.

Legal Significance

This case is significant in South African law for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the interpretation of statutory provisions establishing time limits for administrative bodies, particularly that "may not" in s 25(5) constitutes a prohibition rather than conferring discretion. (2) It affirms the doctrine of legality - that public bodies can only exercise powers expressly conferred by statute and cannot act beyond their statutory mandate even with parties' consent. (3) It establishes that consent or acquiescence by parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a statutory body where the statute expressly prohibits it from acting. (4) It provides guidance on when new points of law may be raised on appeal, particularly where they involve questions of statutory interpretation apparent from the record. (5) It addresses the intersection of customary law and administrative law in the context of traditional leadership disputes. (6) It demonstrates the courts' willingness to enforce strict compliance with procedural requirements in the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, protecting traditional communities from irregular processes.

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Cites

  • Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others(CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30
  • South African Police Service v Public Servants Association

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