Sibanye Gold Limited and Others v The Valuation Appeal Board for Rand West City Local Municipality and Others

The appellants (Sibanye Gold Limited and related entities) and Rand West City Local Municipality have been in litigation since 2013 regarding valuation of mining properties and municipal property rates. Following amendments to the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 effective 01 July 2015, which allowed rating of certain above-surface infrastructure on mining properties, the Municipality published SVR4 (Supplementary Valuation Roll 4) in September 2019, valuing the appellants' mining rights at approximately R3.158 billion. The appellants objected and lodged appeals with the Valuation Appeal Board (VAB). In May 2022, parties agreed to separate certain legal interpretation issues for determination first. The VAB issued a ruling on 19 July 2022 on these separated issues, finding various infrastructure items rateable. The appellants launched a review application on 04 November 2022. The Municipality raised a preliminary point under PAJA section 7(2)(c) regarding failure to exhaust internal remedies. On 09 September 2024, Makume J dismissed the review application, ordering appeal proceedings before the VAB to proceed to finality. The appellants applied for leave to appeal on 30 September 2024. The Municipality brought a section 18(3) application for interim enforcement. On 23 January 2025, Makume J dismissed the leave to appeal application and granted the section 18(3) execution order. The appellants appealed under section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act.

• Whether the court a quo erred in granting the section 18(3) execution order after dismissing the application for leave to appeal
• Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify departure from the automatic suspension of execution under section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act
• Whether the Municipality proved on a balance of probabilities that it would suffer irreparable harm if the execution order was not granted
• Whether the appellants would suffer irreparable harm if the execution order was granted
• The proper interpretation and application of section 18 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 2. The order of the court a quo granting the third respondent's section 18(3) application is upheld, with costs, and the order of 09 September 2024 is immediately operational and executable.

The ratio decidendi includes: (1) Section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act does not make a court's power to reverse automatic suspension dependent on a decision being subject to an application for leave to appeal or an appeal - the court may order otherwise even after dismissing leave to appeal; (2) Exceptional circumstances under section 18(3) can be established where protracted delays in finalizing appeal proceedings (significantly beyond statutory timeframes) prevent a municipality from implementing valuation rolls and fulfilling constitutional obligations to manage administration and provide essential services; (3) Irreparable harm to a municipality can be established by demonstrating ongoing inability to properly manage finances and budgeting due to delayed finalization of appeal proceedings, regardless of the eventual outcome; (4) A party does not suffer irreparable harm if it retains the right to review final administrative decisions and pursue further appeals, as any overpayment can be addressed through those processes; (5) The test under section 18(3) requires proof of both exceptional circumstances and, on a balance of probabilities, irreparable harm to the applicant and no irreparable harm to the respondent.

The court made obiter observations that the appellants appeared to be "litigating lavishly at the expense of the public" given their pursuit of multiple appeal processes. The court also noted that the appellants' retraction from the agreement to continue with VAB proceedings after receiving an unfavorable ruling on separated issues was "disturbing." These comments reflected judicial concern about protracted litigation strategies but were not essential to the legal determination. The court also observed that while it is neither desirable nor possible to lay down precise rules about what constitutes exceptional circumstances, each case must be decided on its own facts, citing established jurisprudence on this point.

This case provides important guidance on the interpretation and application of section 18 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, particularly regarding execution orders under section 18(3). It clarifies that a court retains jurisdiction to grant an execution order even after dismissing an application for leave to appeal, as the power to order otherwise is not dependent on a pending appeal process. The judgment emphasizes that exceptional circumstances can be found where protracted procedural delays prevent a municipality from fulfilling its constitutional obligations to manage its administration and provide essential services to communities, even if the delay is not caused by bad faith. It reinforces that public interest and the constitutional duties of municipalities are relevant considerations when assessing exceptional circumstances and irreparable harm under section 18(3). The case also confirms that the test for execution orders is twofold: establishing exceptional circumstances plus proof on a balance of probabilities of irreparable harm to the applicant and no irreparable harm to the respondent.