These four consolidated claims challenged the Secretary of State for Transport's decision on 26 June 2018 to designate the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS) under section 5 of the Planning Act 2008. The ANPS set out Government policy on the need for new airport capacity in the South East of England and identified the preferred scheme as a third runway at Heathrow to the north west of existing runways (the NWR Scheme). The claimants included individual claimants (Neil Spurrier), local authorities (Hillingdon and other London Boroughs affected by Heathrow), the Mayor of London, and environmental organizations (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Plan B Earth). The ANPS followed years of analysis, including the establishment of the independent Airports Commission (AC) in 2012, which recommended the NWR Scheme in its 2015 Final Report after considering alternatives including a second runway at Gatwick and an extended northern runway at Heathrow. The Secretary of State conducted extensive consultations in February 2017 and October 2017 on draft versions of the ANPS, receiving over 83,000 responses. The Transport Committee scrutinized the revised draft ANPS and made recommendations, which the Government accepted. The House of Commons approved the ANPS by 415 votes to 119 on 25 June 2018. Key issues included surface access to Heathrow, air quality compliance with EU Air Quality Directive limits, habitat protection under the Habitats Directive, compliance with the SEA Directive requirements for environmental assessment, consultation processes, and climate change impacts. The ANPS required that the NWR Scheme be delivered compatibly with air quality legal obligations (with failure to demonstrate compliance resulting in refusal of development consent), achieve specified public transport mode share targets (50% by 2030, 55% by 2040 for passengers), and satisfy habitat protection requirements. The UK's climate change framework was established by the Climate Change Act 2008, which set a mandatory target to reduce UK carbon emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. This target was based on limiting global temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The Paris Agreement in 2015 established more ambitious international objectives of limiting temperature rise to "well below 2°C" and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The CCC had advised that aviation emissions should be no higher in 2050 than 2005 levels (37.5 MtCO2), though this "Aviation Target" had not been formally adopted by the Government. Interested parties included Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL), which promoted the scheme, and Arora Holdings Limited.
The High Court dismissed all grounds addressed in this portion of the judgment and dismissed all four claims. Ground 9 and all five sub-grounds relating to SEA Directive compliance failed. Ground 10 (consultation/pre-determination by Hillingdon Claimants) failed. Ground 17 (consultation by Mr Spurrier) failed. Ground 18 (bias) failed. Grounds 11-16 and 22 (climate change grounds) failed. Grounds 19-20 (human rights) failed. The court granted permission to proceed only on the following grounds, but then refused the substantive applications: Ground 8 (Habitats: both sub-grounds), Grounds 9.1 and 9.2 (SEA: these two sub-grounds only) and Ground 10 (consultation). Permission was refused on all other grounds. All four consolidated claims were dismissed. The Secretary of State (respondent) was the winning party on all grounds.
The binding legal principles include: (1) For SEA Directive compliance, the "Blewett approach" applies, which is conventional Wednesbury review - article 5(2) requires information that "may reasonably be required", connoting evaluative judgment by the decision-maker reviewable only on grounds of irrationality. Courts will intervene where decision-makers wholly fail to address subjects explicitly required by the Directive, but the nature, level of detail and extent of analysis are matters of judgment. (2) The SEA Directive permits iterative assessment processes and cumulative assessment of environmental effects on multiple plans or authorities may be appropriate for strategic policy-making. (3) On consultation and pre-determination, Ministers exercising statutory policy-making functions (such as proposing and designating an NPS under PA 2008) are entitled to have strong predisposition in favor of their proposed policies. Predisposition must be distinguished from actual or apparent pre-determination. The statutory scheme expecting Ministers to propose, consult on and promote policies through Parliament is relevant context. Statements expressing strong support for a policy, intent to proceed, and encouragement of support are consistent with permissible predisposition and do not establish actual or apparent pre-determination. "Clear pointers" are required before courts may infer a closed or apparently closed mind. (4) "Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change" for purposes of section 5(8) PA 2008 means policy as set out in domestic legislation, particularly the Climate Change Act 2008. The CCA 2008 established "entrenched" policy with a mandatory target to reduce UK carbon emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. This target can only be amended through the statutory process set out in the CCA 2008 (section 2), requiring significant developments in scientific knowledge or international law/policy, advice from the Committee on Climate Change, and Parliamentary affirmative resolution procedure. (5) International agreements like the Paris Agreement, although ratified by the UK, have no domestic legal force unless incorporated by statute (dualist system principle). The Paris Agreement expresses global objectives and aspirations but imposes no obligation upon any individual state to limit global temperatures or implement objectives in any particular way. It requires each state to determine its own nationally determined contributions in light of different national circumstances. The Paris Agreement temperature goals (well below 2°C, pursuing 1.5°C) are not "Government policy" for purposes of section 5(8) PA 2008. (6) Section 10 of the PA 2008 (requiring the Secretary of State to exercise functions with objective of contributing to sustainable development and to have regard to desirability of mitigating climate change) must be read together with the CCA 2008. Both sections 5(8) and 10(3) of the PA 2008 refer to "mitigating, and adapting to, climate change" which is precisely the objective of the CCA 2008. The link between the Acts is clear and they are to be read together. (7) International commitments regarding climate change are a consideration in respect of which a decision-maker has discretion as to whether to take them into account. Where a decision-maker has discretion whether to take into account a particular consideration, a decision not to take it into account is challengeable only on conventional public law grounds. Given the CCA 2008 statutory scheme and ongoing work on whether and how to amend domestic law to take account of the Paris Agreement, the Secretary of State did not act unlawfully in not taking the Paris Agreement into account when designating the ANPS. (8) "Carbon reduction targets" in paragraph 5.82 of the ANPS refers to targets (including carbon budgets) set by the CCA 2008 as in force at the date a DCO application is determined. It includes emissions from international aviation (given section 10(2)(i) CCA 2008). Assessment will include emissions from aircraft in flight. The phrase "material impact on the ability of the Government to meet its carbon reduction targets" contains fact-and-degree language that cannot be divorced from the fact-finding exercise to be carried out on a DCO application. (9) Planning policy documents, particularly high-level strategic planning policies, cannot be construed in the same strict exegetical way as statutory or contractual provisions. They contain broad statements of policy whose application depends on later judgment applied to given facts.
The court made several significant observations: (1) While proceeding on the basis that either actual or apparent pre-determination could in principle vitiate a ministerial decision, the court noted force in reasoning that only actual pre-determination should apply to ministerial decisions, given constitutional differences between Ministers exercising policy-making functions and local planning authorities. This issue was left open for full argument in an appropriate case. (2) The court noted that judicial review proceedings generally do not enable disputes of fact and expert opinion to be resolved. Extensive witness evidence on SEA adequacy issues was unnecessary and generally inappropriate. Expert evidence should only exceptionally be produced where necessary to explain technical matters, should be non-tendentious and must comply with CPR Part 35. (3) The court observed that the CCC's October 2016 Report had advised that the UK's existing 2050 target (derived as a contribution to a global path aimed at keeping temperatures to around 2°C) was potentially consistent with a wide range of global temperature outcomes and was compatible with the Paris Agreement. The CCC recommended not changing the 2050 target immediately but focusing on meeting existing targets, with opportunities to revisit in future as technologies develop and global ambition becomes clearer. (4) The court noted that in the earlier Carbon Target JR, Supperstone J held that the Paris Agreement does not impose any legally binding target on each specific contracting party to achieve any specified temperature level by 2050; section 2 CCA 2008 gave the Secretary of State a power but not a duty to amend the 2050 target; and on the basis of CCC advice that the existing target was potentially consistent with the Paris Agreement, the Secretary of State was plainly entitled to refuse to change it. Asplin LJ refused permission to appeal. (5) The court observed that Plan B Earth had requested the Secretary of State to review the ANPS under section 6 PA 2008 on the basis that the Paris Agreement was a "significant change in circumstances." This was declined by letter dated 27 November 2018. That decision was judicially reviewable but no challenge was made. (6) The court noted the Government had commissioned the CCC to provide advice on options for the date by which the UK should achieve net zero GHG and/or net zero carbon targets to contribute to Paris Agreement ambitions, and whether now is the right time to set such a target. A final Aviation Strategy addressing these issues was expected later in 2019. (7) The court observed that Hansard demonstrated sections 5(8) and 10(3) PA 2008 were introduced by Government amendment in response to members who wished to see more specific requirements that climate change and CCA 2008 reduction targets be considered when NPSs were drawn up. The amendments were made to "clarify" or make "explicit" that existing provisions encompassed climate change issues. (8) The court noted that in parallel human rights challenges to the refusal to amend the 2050 target (the Carbon Target JR), Supperstone J and Asplin LJ had held that challenges based on article 2, article 8 and A1P1 ECHR were unarguable. The court applied similar reasoning to reject human rights challenges to the ANPS designation.
This judgment provides authoritative guidance on several important areas of administrative and environmental law. On SEA compliance, it definitively establishes that challenges to environmental reports are subject to conventional Wednesbury review (the "Blewett approach"), not a free-standing "sufficient quality" test. On consultation and pre-determination, it provides important clarification that where statutory schemes entrust Ministers with proposing, promoting and designating policy (as under PA 2008), strong predisposition in favor of the proposed policy is permissible and does not indicate actual or apparent pre-determination. Ministers are expected to promote their policies, including through Parliament. On climate change law, the judgment clarifies the relationship between domestic statutory climate targets and international agreements. It establishes that "Government policy" for purposes of section 5(8) PA 2008 means policy as set out in domestic legislation, particularly the Climate Change Act 2008 "entrenched" targets. International agreements like the Paris Agreement, while ratified, have no domestic legal force unless incorporated by statute and impose no specific binding obligations on individual states. The court confirmed that the CCA 2008 established a statutory framework for the UK's contribution to global climate goals, with the 2050 target of 80% reduction based on limiting temperature rise to 2°C. This target can only be amended through the statutory process set out in the CCA 2008, requiring significant developments in scientific knowledge or international law/policy, advice from the Committee on Climate Change, and Parliamentary affirmative resolution. The judgment establishes that section 10 PA 2008 (sustainable development and climate change mitigation) must be read together with the CCA 2008. While international commitments are not mandatory considerations, they fall within the decision-maker's discretion. Given the CCA 2008 statutory scheme and ongoing work on implementing the Paris Agreement, the Secretary of State did not act unlawfully in not taking the Paris Agreement into account when designating the ANPS. The case has broader implications for judicial review of government policy-making on climate change, confirming appropriate judicial restraint while maintaining scrutiny of legal compliance and rationality. It clarifies that courts will not require decision-makers to pre-empt future policy changes that can only be made through statutory processes. The judgment also provides guidance on the interpretation of planning policy documents, confirming they should not be construed with the same strict exegetical approach as statutory or contractual provisions but must be interpreted practically in light of their application to specific facts.