Third respondent (Bakoor Pty Ltd) applied in October 1997 to South Peninsula Municipality (SPM/second respondent) for rezoning of a 78.7 hectare property on Dassenberg Mountain from agricultural to sub-divisional area for residential and open space purposes. 31.2 hectares fell within the Cape Peninsula Protected Natural Environment (CPPNE). The application attracted 22 letters of objection and opposition from the Cape Metropolitan Council (a state institution). SPM lacked authority to decide under section 16 of LUPO because a state institution opposed, but nevertheless refused the application on 8 September 1998. Third respondent appealed under section 44(1)(a) of LUPO. The first respondent (Minister) treated the matter not as an appeal but as an original application under section 16, approved the rezoning on 5 March 1999 subject to conditions (including ceding 31 hectares to the National Parks Board). The Minister did not personally read the 22 objection letters (only departmental summaries), did not notify objectors of the application before him, and conducted site inspections without notice to objectors.
The Minister's decision of 5 March 1999 approving the rezoning was set aside. Third respondent was ordered to pay the costs of its opposition to the application, including costs of two counsel.
A decision-maker exercising administrative power under planning legislation must comply with the constitutional right to procedurally fair administrative action under section 33 of the Constitution. This requires: (1) that the decision-maker personally consider actual written objections where practicable, not merely rely on summaries prepared by officials or interested parties, as summaries prepared at different stages by different parties with different interests and perspectives cannot adequately convey objections; (2) that objectors who successfully opposed an application at first instance must be notified when the matter comes before another authority for reconsideration and be given an opportunity to make representations, regardless of whether the matter proceeds as an appeal or as a fresh application - the absence of express statutory provision for such notice does not displace the constitutional right; (3) that procedural fairness in planning matters requires that persons who made representations should be notified and heard by the very person who is to take action, not merely through intermediaries who may miss points in their favour or give undue emphasis against them.
The Court noted approvingly Olivier JA's statement in Director: Mineral Development v Save the Vaal Environment that the Constitution's inclusion of environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable human rights requires that environmental considerations be accorded appropriate recognition in administrative processes, necessitating a change in legal and administrative approach to environmental concerns. The Court also observed that requiring compliance with environmental legislation enacted in the public interest (such as the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989 or National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998) cannot constitute prejudice as this affects all environmentally sensitive developments. The Court expressed the prima facie view (following Hayes) that while letters of objection should normally be read by the decision-maker, a reasonably accurate summary may in some circumstances eliminate unnecessarily prolix and repetitive matter, though this was not the case here.
This case is significant in South African administrative and planning law for establishing that: (1) Decision-makers must personally consider actual written objections, not merely summaries, especially where objections are not voluminous; (2) Successful objectors have a constitutional right to be notified of further proceedings and to make representations when a matter is reheard by a different authority, even where legislation does not expressly provide for such notice; (3) Environmental considerations must be accorded appropriate recognition in administrative processes given constitutional environmental rights; (4) The principle of procedural fairness (audi alteram partem) applies robustly in planning decisions affecting public and environmental interests; (5) Administrative convenience cannot override fundamental constitutional rights to fair administrative action. The case applies pre-PAJA constitutional administrative law principles and interprets section 33 of the Constitution with Item 23(2) of Schedule 6.