Mike Campbell (Private) Limited and William Michael Campbell v The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement and The Attorney-General

The first applicant owned Mount Carmel farm (1200.6484 hectares) in Hartley District, used for commercial farming including horticulture, fruit-growing and ranching. The second applicant was a director and shareholder residing on the farm. The acquiring authority issued preliminary notices to acquire the land for resettlement in 1997, 2001, and 2004. The applicants objected each time. Following litigation challenges by owners of at least 157 pieces of agricultural land, the Legislature enacted Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005, which introduced section 16B into the Constitution. This section retroactively vested agricultural land identified in preliminary notices (including Mount Carmel) in the State with effect from 14 September 2005 (the appointed day), without requiring court confirmation and limiting compensation to improvements only. Schedule 7 listed 157 pieces of land acquired under this provision.

• Whether the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005 introducing section 16B violated fundamental rights under sections 11, 16(1), 18(1), 18(9) and 23 of the Constitution
• Whether section 16B violated the 'essential features' or 'core values' of the Constitution, particularly protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law
• Whether the Legislature had power under section 52(1) to amend or repeal provisions relating to fundamental rights
• Whether failure to pay fair compensation within a reasonable time invalidates the acquisition of agricultural land
• Whether section 16B(3)'s ouster of court jurisdiction violates the separation of powers and rule of law
• Whether the applicants were entitled to an order of mandamus compelling payment of compensation

Application dismissed. Each party to bear its own costs.

1. Where a Constitution uses clear, unambiguous language granting the Legislature power to "amend, add to or repeal ANY of the provisions" of the Constitution (section 52(1)), no implied limitations based on 'essential features' or 'core values' doctrines can restrict that power, provided the prescribed special procedure is followed. 2. Fundamental rights expressed as subject to "the provisions of this Constitution" (section 11) are subject to constitutional amendment and are not absolutely entrenched. 3. The validity of a constitutional amendment is determined solely by compliance with prescribed procedural and substantive requirements (manner and form), not by its content or effect on fundamental rights. 4. A provision that takes away rights by referential operation (e.g., "shall not apply") constitutes an amendment or addition to the Constitution within the meaning of section 52(1). 5. The Legislature has competence to oust court jurisdiction by clear language, provided it acts within its constitutional powers and follows the special amendment procedure. 6. Payment of compensation for compulsorily acquired property is a consequence of lawful acquisition, not a pre-condition; failure to pay does not invalidate an otherwise lawful acquisition. 7. Courts retain inherent jurisdiction to determine whether a purported acquisition complies with the jurisdictional requirements of the authorizing law, even where jurisdiction to challenge lawful acquisitions is ousted.

1. The court noted that the provisions of section 16B had no reference to race or color of landowners, suggesting no violation of section 23 (non-discrimination) occurred, though this was not fully argued. 2. MALABA JA observed that the question of what property should be acquired and in what manner "is a question of a political and legislative character" not a judicial question. 3. The court commented that litigation by landowners was viewed by the Legislature as "obstructive of the land reform programme" and aimed at delaying its finalization in hope of reversal. 4. The judgment noted that under colonial domination people of Zimbabwe were "unjustifiably dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation" and took up arms to regain land and political sovereignty - referencing the historical context in section 16A. 5. The court observed that the "former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation" and if it fails, the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land acquired for resettlement. 6. MALABA JA stated that giving expropriated owners a right to challenge lawful acquisitions "would amount to no more than its abuse" since their personal conduct and circumstances are irrelevant to acquisitions for public purposes.

This landmark Zimbabwe constitutional case establishes that fundamental rights in the Zimbabwean Constitution are not absolutely entrenched and can be amended or repealed by the Legislature provided the special procedure in section 52(1) is strictly followed. The judgment rejected the Indian 'basic structure' doctrine and affirmed broad parliamentary sovereignty over constitutional amendment. It legitimized the fast-track land reform program by validating retrospective constitutional amendments that: (1) vested agricultural land in the State without prior court authorization; (2) limited compensation to improvements only; and (3) ousted court jurisdiction to challenge acquisitions. The case demonstrates the supremacy of clear constitutional language over implied limitations, and the courts' limited role in reviewing constitutional amendments that comply with prescribed procedures. It significantly expanded state power over private property for public purposes and limited judicial review in land reform matters. While decided by Zimbabwe's Supreme Court, it provides comparative insight for South African jurisprudence on constitutional amendment powers, property rights, land reform, and the limits of judicial review.