CMAL (Private) Limited v Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement N.O and Registrar of Deeds

The applicant was the former owner of Teviotdale Farm, measuring 186.4600 hectares, situated in the district of Salisbury. On 22 October 2000, the applicant was served with a notice of intention to acquire the land in terms of s 5 of the Land Acquisition Act. On 17 December 2001, an order of acquisition was granted in terms of s 8 of the Land Acquisition Act. The applicant challenged the acquisition on several grounds: (1) the land consisted of a rocky hill unsuitable for agricultural purposes; (2) the land contained dwellings where the Managing Director's family resided; (3) horses were kept on the property for riding purposes; (4) there were dwellings for domestic workers and cottages for visitors; (5) the land was a small holding in a peri-urban area; and (6) since acquisition in 2001, no one had been allocated the land or issued with an offer letter, and it had never been occupied except briefly by illegal gold panners. The applicant sought to have the acquisition set aside, arguing it had lapsed because the first respondent did not apply to confirm it, and that the land was not suitable for agricultural purposes as contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the acquisition of agricultural land in light of s 16B(3) of the Constitutional Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005
• Whether the acquisition of Teviotdale Farm was done outside the provisions of s 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution
• Whether land used for horse breeding and containing residential dwellings constitutes 'agricultural land' as defined in the Constitution
• Whether land situated in a peri-urban area can be classified as agricultural land subject to acquisition
• Whether the failure to allocate the land or issue offer letters after acquisition renders the acquisition invalid
• Whether confirmation by court order remained a requirement for land acquisition after the Constitutional Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005

The application was dismissed with costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 16B(3) of the Constitutional Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005 ousts the jurisdiction of courts to challenge land acquisitions made lawfully under s 16B(2)(a), except for matters relating to compensation for improvements; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction only to determine whether an acquisition is, on the face of the record, made in accordance with s 16B(2)(a) - this is a jurisdictional question requiring judicial determination; (3) 'Agricultural land' includes land used for animal husbandry, including horse breeding, and encompasses land suitable for horticulture, viticulture, forestry, aquaculture, and the keeping or breeding of livestock, game, poultry, animals or bees; (4) Land in peri-urban areas can constitute agricultural land provided it is not within the boundaries of an urban local authority or communal land; (5) Rocky or hilly terrain does not disqualify land from being classified as agricultural land; (6) Following the Constitutional Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005, court confirmation of land acquisitions is no longer required; (7) The State's failure to allocate acquired land or issue offer letters does not invalidate a lawful acquisition under s 16B(2)(a).

The court made non-binding observations that if the applicant was interested in the farm, there was nothing stopping it from making an application to be issued with an offer letter itself. The court also observed that how the State chooses to deal with acquired State land 'is its business,' suggesting judicial deference to executive decisions regarding the management and allocation of acquired land. The court noted that while the first respondent did not specifically dispute the applicant's factual averment that the land was unsuitable for agriculture, the court was nevertheless not convinced by this assertion based on the objective characteristics of the land and the activities conducted on it.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean land reform jurisprudence as it clarifies the scope of court jurisdiction following the Constitutional Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005. It reinforces the principle that courts cannot entertain challenges to land acquisitions lawfully made under s 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution, while confirming that courts retain jurisdiction only to determine whether an acquisition was made in accordance with constitutional requirements (a jurisdictional question) or to adjudicate compensation disputes. The case provides important guidance on the definition of 'agricultural land,' establishing that animal husbandry (including horse breeding) falls within this definition, and that land in peri-urban areas or with rocky terrain can still qualify as agricultural land. It also confirms that post-amendment, court confirmation of acquisitions is no longer required, and that the State's failure to allocate acquired land does not invalidate the acquisition. The judgment demonstrates the court's strict adherence to the constitutional framework for land reform while maintaining a limited supervisory role over the legality of acquisition procedures.