[MEDIA SUMMARY] Matoto v Free State Gambling and Liquor Authority and others

The appellant applied to the Free State Gambling and Liquor Authority (the Authority) for permanent removal of the registration of a liquor licence to new premises in terms of section 41 of the Free State Gambling and Liquor Act 6 of 2010. The Authority refused the application and informed the appellant by letter dated 12 March 2015. The appellant's attorney sent a series of letters to the Authority expressing dissatisfaction and threatening a review application. By the time the review application was launched in the high court, the 180-day period prescribed in section 7(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) had expired. The appellant sought an extension of time in terms of section 9 of PAJA. The high court (per Molitsoane AJ, Rampai J concurring) refused the extension and dismissed the application without considering the substantive merits of the review.

• Whether the high court correctly refused to extend the 180-day time period prescribed in section 7(1) of PAJA for bringing a review application
• Whether the discretion exercised by the high court in refusing the extension was in the 'true' or 'loose' sense
• What standard of interference on appeal should apply to the high court's decision
• Whether the appellant provided a reasonably satisfactory and acceptable explanation for the delay in meeting the 180-day deadline

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The judgment and order of the Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein, refusing the extension of time and dismissing the review application was upheld.

Where an applicant seeks an extension of the 180-day time period prescribed in section 7(1) of PAJA in terms of section 9, the applicant must furnish a reasonably satisfactory and acceptable explanation for the delay. The discretion exercised by a high court in refusing an extension under section 9 of PAJA is a discretion in the 'loose' sense, which determines the standard of interference applicable on appeal. An appellate court will not interfere with such a discretion unless the appellant can demonstrate that the high court's decision was incorrect.

The judgment is a media summary rather than the full judgment, and does not contain detailed obiter dicta. However, the court's discussion of the distinction between discretions in the 'true' and 'loose' sense, and the observation that this distinction dictates the standard of interference on appeal, may be considered obiter insofar as it provides guidance on the general approach to appellate review of discretionary decisions beyond the specific facts of this case. The court did not enter into the substantive merits of the review application itself, as the matter was decided on the preliminary issue of the time extension.

This case clarifies the approach courts should take when determining applications for extension of time under section 9 of PAJA. It reinforces the importance of strict compliance with the 180-day time limit prescribed in section 7(1) of PAJA for bringing review applications, and emphasizes that applicants seeking extensions must provide reasonably satisfactory and acceptable explanations for delays. The case also confirms the distinction between discretions in the 'true' and 'loose' sense and the relevance of this distinction for appellate review, particularly in the context of PAJA extension applications. It demonstrates that merely expressing dissatisfaction through correspondence or threatening to bring review proceedings does not excuse non-compliance with statutory time limits.