Maredi, Charles Elias v Anderson, Gideon Petrus

The applicant (Mr Maredi) and his family had lived and worked on portion 7 of the farm Olifantslaagte since the 1970s, initially under the ownership of Phillip Meyer. The applicant claimed his family had been given consent to reside on the land and graze livestock there. Portion 7 was subsequently transferred through family members (Jakob Meyer, then Japie Meyer) before being purchased by the first respondent (Mr Anderson) in September 2020. Upon purchasing the farm, the first respondent required the applicant to sign a written agreement in Afrikaans limiting his residence rights and restricting livestock to three head of cattle within a demarcated 1.5 hectare area. The applicant, who claimed to be illiterate, alleged he did not understand the agreement's terms. The applicant had approximately 11 cattle, sheep, and goats grazing on the larger grazing area of portion 7. Disputes arose when: (1) the first respondent allegedly entered the applicant's homestead without permission; (2) the first respondent sought to restrict the applicant's livestock to three cattle within the demarcated area; (3) a mud house on the homestead was damaged by winds and the applicant sought permission to rebuild it. The first respondent purported to cancel the agreement in December 2020 and threatened eviction, claiming the applicant breached the agreement by grazing more livestock outside the designated area.

• Whether section 24 of ESTA binds successive landowners to consent given by predecessors in title regarding both residence and use of land (including grazing rights)
• Whether grazing rights are purely personal rights that do not survive transfer of land ownership
• Whether the September 2020 agreement between the applicant and first respondent was binding
• Whether the first respondent lawfully terminated any grazing agreement
• Whether the applicant was entitled to rebuild the damaged mud house
• Whether the first respondent unlawfully trespassed on the applicant's homestead
• The proper interpretation of 'consent' and 'use' under ESTA
• Whether the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop (lease survives sale) applies to ESTA occupiers

1. Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development substituted as second respondent 2. Applicant entitled to demolish and rebuild mud house on same foundations 3. Disputes regarding the binding nature of the September 2020 agreement and historic grazing consent terms referred to oral evidence 4. Pending determination: (a) applicant may not exceed current livestock numbers (11 cattle, 5 sheep, 18 goats) within the historic grazing area on portion 7; (b) first respondent interdicted from entering applicant's homestead or demarcated area without consent 5. Parties to provide list of actual livestock by 24 May 2022 6. Costs reserved (costs in the cause)

Section 24(2) of ESTA statutorily extends the common law principle of huur gaat voor koop (lease survives sale) to bind successive landowners not only to consent given for residence, but also to consent given to 'use' land as contemplated in section 3 of ESTA. The term 'consent' in section 24(2) incorporates consent 'to reside on or use land' as defined in section 3(1), which includes agricultural use such as grazing livestock. Once an owner or person in charge has given consent to an occupier to use land for grazing, that consent binds successors in title by operation of section 24(2), subject to the termination provisions in ESTA. While the right to graze livestock is a personal right requiring initial owner consent (not a naturalia of ESTA residence rights), this does not determine enforceability against successors. The nature of a right as 'personal' does not preclude statutory protection against successive owners - section 24 provides precisely such protection for consent once given. ESTA's references to 'use' of land throughout its provisions (including in definitions of 'suitable alternative accommodation', 'evict', 'terminate' and in sections 3, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 14) must be given effect and not treated as surplusage. These references recognize that ESTA applies to agricultural land where consent may encompass cultivation, crop growing, or livestock grazing - all forms of agricultural use that section 24(2) protects against change of ownership.

The court observed that the 18-page September 2020 agreement with over 80 clauses, written in Afrikaans, presented to an allegedly illiterate occupier without prior opportunity to review or obtain independent advice, raised serious questions about whether there was genuine consensus ad idem. The agreement's complexity, inclusion of GPS coordinates, ESTA legal references, and provisions suggesting legal representation when none existed, combined with the applicant not receiving a copy until after purported cancellation, indicated potential procedural unfairness. The court noted the "somewhat cynical" position of the Meyers and first respondent in suggesting the applicant contributed nothing to portion 7 while residing there since 2001, when this arrangement resulted entirely from decisions made by Phillip Meyer and his family regarding how to structure their operations across portions 7 and 18 - decisions that had the potential to "whittle away" rights the applicant and his wife may have enjoyed pre- or post-ESTA's 1997 commencement. The court observed that courts should be more amenable to referring ESTA disputes to oral evidence rather than strictly applying Plascon-Evans, given that such matters involve constitutionally protected rights to dignity, residence and land use. The dividing line between status, dignity and property in land tenure cases may be difficult to discern as each impacts the others. Regarding Adendorffs and related cases, the court expressed concern about impermissible conflation of inquiries into (1) the nature of a right versus (2) who that right is enforceable against when special common law or statutory provisions apply. Personal rights can bind successors through huur gaat voor koop or section 24 without becoming real rights.

This judgment provides important clarification on the scope of section 24 of ESTA, particularly regarding whether consent to use land (including grazing rights) binds successive landowners. The court rejected narrow interpretations that would limit section 24 to residence only, holding that ESTA's remedial purpose and constitutional foundation require protection of agricultural land use rights granted by predecessors in title. The judgment addresses a fundamental tension in ESTA jurisprudence between viewing grazing as a personal right versus a protected ESTA right. By analogizing to the common law doctrine of huur gaat voor koop and emphasizing ESTA's incorporation of this principle through section 24, the court provides a framework for understanding how personal rights to use land can be binding on successors when consent was given to ESTA occupiers. The case is significant for its holistic interpretation of ESTA provisions, reading sections 3, 6, 24 and the definitions of 'consent', 'evict', 'use' and 'suitable alternative accommodation' together to give effect to the Act's remedial objectives under section 25(6) of the Constitution. It demonstrates judicial willingness to refer complex factual disputes in ESTA matters to oral evidence rather than applying Plascon-Evans strictly, recognizing the constitutional rights at stake.