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South African Law • Jurisdictional Corpus
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De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v Regional Manager, Limpopo: The Department of Mineral Resources & Energy and Others

CitationCase No. 66559/2020, [2023] ZAGPPHC (04 September 2023)
JurisdictionZA
Area of Law
Administrative Law
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Mining and Mineral Resources Law
Environmental Law

Facts of the Case

De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM) operated the Oaks Mine, an open pit diamond mine in Limpopo Province, from 1998 to 2008. The mine was granted a mining license in 1998 under the Minerals Act, with an Environmental Management Programme (EMP) approved in 1998 and amended in 2003. Both EMPs expressly provided that the open pit would remain open upon closure. The MPRDA came into effect on 1 May 2004, repealing the Minerals Act. DBCM applied for a closure certificate on 3 November 2009 under section 43 of the MPRDA, with a closure plan that provided for the pit to remain open. The Regional Manager (1st Respondent) conducted site inspections in 2011 and identified environmental concerns, specifically that the open pit would pose safety risks for scavengers and illegal mining. Between 2011 and 2020, the 1st Respondent repeatedly refused to process the closure application unless DBCM backfilled the open pit, contrary to the approved EMPs. DBCM lodged an internal appeal with the Director-General (2nd Respondent) in July 2020, which remained pending. DBCM then brought this review application without exhausting internal remedies, seeking inter alia a declaration that the pre-amendment section 43 applied to its closure application and that it was not obligated to backfill the pit.

Legal Issues

  • Whether section 43 of the MPRDA as it existed when DBCM lodged its closure application in 2009 (pre-amendment) or the amended section 43 (effective 2013) applies to the determination of the closure application
  • Whether DBCM is obligated to backfill the open pit at the Oaks Mine
  • Whether the 1st Respondent's decision to refuse the closure certificate constitutes reviewable administrative action under PAJA or the principle of legality
  • Whether DBCM should be exempted from the obligation to exhaust internal remedies under section 96 of the MPRDA and section 7(2) of PAJA
  • Whether there was non-joinder of necessary parties
  • Whether the 1st Respondent had authority to depose to the answering affidavit on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents

Judicial Outcome

1. The Applicant is ordered to exhaust the internal remedies, and the matter is sent back to the 3rd Respondent who is directed to consider and decide Applicant's internal appeal within 30 days of the grant of this order, having regard to this Court's judgment and to communicate his decision to DBCM within 10 days of it being taken; 2. The decision on the Appeal is to be taken in line with the legislative framework applicable in respect of the Closure Applications as it presently exists (that is per section 43 of the amended MPRDA). 3. The Applicant to pay the costs of the Application including the costs of two Counsel.

Ratio Decidendi

1. Section 43 of the MPRDA as amended (effective 2013) applies retrospectively to closure applications lodged before the amendment came into force. The amended provisions give effect to NEMA's duty of care and polluter pays principles, which themselves apply retrospectively under section 28(1A) of NEMA. Applying only the pre-amendment section 43 would create conflict with NEMA's retrospective provisions and undermine the legislative purpose of ensuring environmental accountability throughout and after mining operations. 2. The Minister has power under item 10(2) of Schedule II of the MPRDA to direct amendment of environmental management programmes approved under the repealed Minerals Act to bring them into line with the requirements of the MPRDA, notwithstanding item 10(1) which provides for continuation of such programmes. Approved EMPs are not immutable and can be amended to meet current legislative requirements. 3. A court may not review administrative action under PAJA until internal remedies provided for in other legislation (such as section 96 of the MPRDA) have been exhausted, unless exceptional circumstances exist and the court deems it in the interest of justice to grant an exemption under section 7(2)(c) of PAJA. Delay by the administrative authority in deciding an appeal, standing alone, does not constitute exceptional circumstances, particularly where the applicant has itself contributed to delay in the administrative process. 4. The duty to exhaust internal remedies serves important constitutional values including accountability, responsiveness and openness in democratic government, and allows administrative bodies to utilize their specialist expertise before courts intervene. Premature recourse to litigation undermines the autonomy of the administrative process.

Obiter Dicta

The Court made several non-binding observations: 1. The Court noted that environmental rehabilitation is an ongoing process that remains post-cessation of operations and after issuing of closure certificates, and environmental liability is not extinguished by the lapse of mining rights. 2. The Court observed that the 2005 Guidelines issued by the DMRE, while possibly directory rather than peremptory, serve the important purpose of guiding holders of old order mining rights on compliance with the MPRDA's requirements and align with the objective of restoring land to its pre-mining production potential. 3. The Court commented that DBCM's own conduct contributed significantly to the delays in the matter, having taken six years to respond to the 1st Respondent's initial decision in 2011, which undermined its argument about unreasonable delay by the authorities. 4. The Court noted without deciding that the issue of non-joinder of parties such as the Minister of Water and Sanitation, the Chief Inspector of Mines, and other regulatory authorities might be relevant depending on which legislative framework applied, as section 43(5) requires written confirmation from various authorities before a closure certificate can be issued. 5. The Court observed that in terms of Rule 7(1) of the Uniform Rules, the deponent to an affidavit need not be authorized by the party concerned to depose to the affidavit - it is the institution and prosecution of proceedings that must be authorized. Technical objections based on textual analysis of authorization are discouraged as they lead to costly and wasteful investigations.

Legal Significance

This case is significant for South African mining and environmental law as it clarifies the retrospective application of amended mining closure provisions and the interaction between the MPRDA and NEMA. The judgment reinforces that environmental obligations, particularly the polluter pays principle and duty of care under NEMA, apply retrospectively and cannot be circumvented by reliance on earlier approved environmental management programmes. It confirms that mining right holders remain responsible for environmental rehabilitation even after cessation of operations and that approved EMPs can be amended to bring them into line with current legislative requirements. The case also emphasizes the importance of exhausting internal remedies under section 96 of the MPRDA before approaching courts for review, and provides guidance on when exceptional circumstances may justify bypassing this requirement. The judgment demonstrates the courts' deference to administrative processes and expertise in the highly technical field of mine closure and environmental rehabilitation. It has implications for all holders of old order mining rights and owners of closed mines regarding their ongoing environmental liabilities.

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