The applicant obtained a Labour Court judgment on 15 November 2005 (LC/MT/27/2005) ordering the respondent to either reinstate him without loss of salary and benefits, or pay damages for loss of employment. The respondent did not comply with either limb of the order. After approximately 19 years of abeyance, the applicant sought to revive the judgment. The applicant had initially approached the Labour Court for revival but withdrew that application after the respondent raised a preliminary point that the Labour Court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, had no power to revive a superannuated judgment as revival is a common law remedy. The applicant then approached the High Court for revival of the Labour Court judgment.
All preliminary points raised by the respondent were dismissed. The matter was set down for arguments on the merits. Costs of suit were ordered to be in the cause.
1. The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to revive superannuated Labour Court judgments, notwithstanding that the Labour Court itself lacks express statutory power to revive its own judgments. 2. The Labour Court is a specialized division of the High Court, and while it may not have certain powers in its specialized statutory form, the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction to regulate processes and administer justice in areas not expressly prohibited by statute. 3. Revival of a judgment debt (including a Labour Court judgment) is governed by section 15 of the Prescription Act, which provides for 30-year prescription, not the shorter limitation periods applicable to unfair labour practice claims under the Labour Act. 4. Superannuation and prescription are distinct legal concepts: prescription extinguishes a right after a specified period, while superannuation is a common law principle that prevents enforcement of an order after 3 years without first obtaining a revival order; a prescribed order cannot be revived, but a superannuated one can be.
The court observed that where a point of entry is non-existent for a member of the public in the form of procedure, one is inherently created in the interests of justice by a court of inherent jurisdiction. The court noted that the repeal of Order 40 Rule 448 of the 1971 High Court Rules (which dealt with superannuation) and the failure to provide a similar provision in the 2021 Rules created a lacuna that the legislature should address, but in the meantime, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction fills this gap. The court also commented that issues of citation and amendment of parties' names in Labour Court proceedings should be dealt with by the Labour Court itself, not the High Court on an application for revival.
This case establishes important principles regarding the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to revive superannuated Labour Court judgments in Zimbabwe. It clarifies the relationship between the High Court and the Labour Court, recognizing that while the Labour Court is a specialized statutory court with limited jurisdiction, the High Court retains inherent powers to fill procedural lacunae. The judgment distinguishes between prescription and superannuation as distinct legal concepts, confirming that judgment debts (including Labour Court judgments) are subject to 30-year prescription under section 15 of the Prescription Act rather than the shorter limitation periods for labour disputes. The case provides guidance on when parties can seek revival of Labour Court orders and which forum is appropriate for such applications.