Zola Kenneth Gunqisa and Others v The State

On 21 March 1999, Freddie Maebela was arrested by the second and fourth appellants (police officers) at Mrs Moloi's house in Vosloorus while he was driving a Toyota Conquest. The appellants told Mrs Moloi they were policemen taking Maebela to the police station. Three days earlier, the Conquest had been stolen from Godfrey Gunqisa (brother of the first and third appellants) by armed robbers. The appellants went to Vosloorus after receiving information about the stolen vehicle's location. After arresting Maebela, the second appellant placed him in the boot of an Opel Astra. According to the appellants, Maebela escaped when the boot opened on its own due to a faulty latch while driving over a speed hump. Ten days later, a badly decomposed body was discovered in mieliefields at Dunnottar and identified by relatives as Maebela. The body showed a gunshot wound to the head and a fractured skull. The appellants were convicted of kidnapping and murder, with sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years' imprisonment.

• Whether the appellants' conduct constituted kidnapping rather than a lawful arrest
• Whether the defence version that the deceased escaped from the boot of the vehicle was reasonably possibly true
• Whether the body was adequately identified as that of the deceased
• Whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants murdered the deceased
• The proper application of the standard of proof in criminal cases where the accused's version is reasonably possibly true

The appeal succeeded. The convictions for both kidnapping and murder, as well as all sentences imposed, were set aside. The appellants were acquitted.

In criminal proceedings, where the accused's version is reasonably possibly true in substance, the court must decide the matter on acceptance of that version, even if parts of it may be improbable. A defence version can only be rejected on the basis of inherent probabilities if it can be said to be so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; a mere preponderance of probabilities is insufficient. The court must consider all evidence, including conduct that is consistent with innocence, when determining whether the State has discharged its burden of proof.

The Court noted that the medical evidence as to whether the body could have been that of a person who died ten days previously was equivocal, but found it unnecessary to determine the identification issue given the finding that the defence version was reasonably possibly true. The Court also observed that if the second appellant had been guilty of murder, he would either have made no entry in the occurrence book at all or would have concocted a story of escape, rather than providing full details of himself, the fourth appellant, and the arrest. The Court remarked that the significance of the occurrence book entry was overlooked by the trial court.

This case is significant in South African criminal law for reinforcing the proper application of the standard of proof in criminal cases. It emphasizes that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an accused's version need not be accepted in every detail - if it is reasonably possibly true in substance, the accused must be acquitted. The judgment serves as an important reminder that courts cannot reject a defence version solely on the basis of improbability unless the version is so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true. The case also illustrates the importance of considering all evidence, including conduct consistent with innocence (such as the occurrence book entry), when evaluating whether the State has discharged its burden of proof.