Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA) v Kasikai Mashonganyika

The respondent was employed by the appellant as a watchman from 3 May 2005. He lodged a complaint of unfair labour practice alleging that since January 2010, the appellant had been paying him a salary below the national employment council rates and had not been paying him transport and housing allowances. The matter was referred to arbitration where the respondent claimed $15,293.84 in arrear salaries and allowances. The appellant raised a point in limine regarding the legality of a labour consultant representing the respondent in arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator dismissed the point in limine, holding that Article 24(4) of the Arbitration Act allowed an employee to be represented by a person of their choice, including a labour consultant. The appellant appealed to the Labour Court, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Whether a labour consultant has the authority to represent a party in arbitration proceedings
• Whether section 92 of the Labour Act, which limits representation before the Labour Court to legal practitioners or trade union officials, applies to arbitration proceedings
• Whether Article 24(4) of the Arbitration Act, which allows representation by 'any person of their choice', is inconsistent with section 92 of the Labour Act
• The proper interpretation of section 98(9) of the Labour Act which gives arbitrators 'the same powers as the Labour Court'

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Article 24(4) of the Arbitration Act, which allows parties to arbitration proceedings to be represented by 'any other person of their choice', permits representation by labour consultants. Section 92 of the Labour Act, which limits representation before the Labour Court to legal practitioners or trade union officials, does not apply to arbitration proceedings. There is no inconsistency between section 92 of the Labour Act and Article 24(4) of the Arbitration Act because they govern representation in different forums. The powers conferred on arbitrators under section 98(9) of the Labour Act ('the same powers as the Labour Court') refer to substantive and jurisdictional powers outlined in section 89, not to procedural matters such as who may represent parties. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts should apply its ordinary meaning without departing from the natural grammatical sense of the words used.

The court clarified the proper meaning of 'locus standi', explaining that it concerns the relationship between the cause of action and the relief sought, and that a representative (whether a legal practitioner or labour consultant) has no personal interest in the cause of action - they are merely agents of the party who has locus standi. The court noted that the appellant's constitutional argument regarding alleged violations of section 69 of the Constitution and the Legal Practitioners Act was not properly raised in accordance with required procedures and therefore fell away. The court observed that the Legislature must be taken to have deliberately widened the scope of representation for arbitration proceedings beyond that available in the Labour Court, given that both provisions are clear and neither contains qualifying language such as 'subject to'.

This judgment is significant in Zimbabwean labour law as it clarifies the distinction between representation before the Labour Court and representation in arbitration proceedings. It establishes that while section 92 of the Labour Act restricts representation before the Labour Court to legal practitioners and trade union officials, arbitration proceedings are governed by the more permissive provisions of Article 24(4) of the Arbitration Act, which allows parties to be represented by any person of their choice, including labour consultants. The judgment also provides important guidance on statutory interpretation, particularly regarding when provisions in different statutes are considered inconsistent, and reinforces the principle that clear statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning. The case demonstrates that powers conferred on arbitrators under section 98(9) of the Labour Act relate to jurisdiction and substantive powers, not procedural matters such as representation.