The applicant had been contracted to provide security services to the second respondent (Buffalo City TVET College). Following a re-tender process, the applicant's contract was to be substituted by the first respondent, despite the applicant having participated in the bidding process. On 18 July 2025, Stretch J granted an interim order in the applicant's favour, restoring the status quo ante pending the institution and finalization of review proceedings challenging the bid adjudication and evaluation process. The second respondent requested reasons for the order on 21 July 2025. On 22 July 2025, the first respondent filed a notice of application for leave to appeal citing seven grounds of misdirection, before reasons had been provided. The first respondent's conduct throughout the process was characterized by evasiveness, including preventing the Sheriff from executing the 18 July order, failing to respond to court communications, confirming attendance and then cancelling at the last minute citing counsel's unavailability, and dismissing the court's concerns about the premature nature of the application in an email described as disrespectful.
1. Declared that the application for leave to appeal in the absence of written reasons was premature. 2. Declared that the order of 18 July 2025 was interim and not appealable. 3. Declared that the order of 18 July 2025 was not suspended and remained fully operative pending final determination of the review application set down for 27 November 2025. 4. The first respondent was ordered to pay costs on the attorney and own client scale. 5. The registrar was directed to place a copy of the judgment before the Eastern Cape branch of the Legal Practice Council. 6. The registrar was directed to make a copy of the judgment available to Appels AJA who had reserved judgment in the applicant's contempt application against the first respondent.
An application for leave to appeal cannot be brought before written reasons for a judgment have been provided where those reasons have been requested by a party, as Rule 49(1)(b) specifically extends the period for applying for leave to appeal when reasons are given on a later date, demonstrating reasons are a prerequisite. Interim or interlocutory orders not having the effect of final judgment are generally not appealable, and the interests of justice must favour granting leave to appeal. Section 18(2) of the Superior Courts Act provides that interim orders are not suspended pending appeal unless exceptional circumstances exist and the applicant proves irreparable harm on a balance of probabilities - these requirements are conjunctive. Bad faith conduct and abuse of court process, including disrespectful treatment of the court and tactical delay designed to frustrate execution of orders, justify punitive costs orders on the attorney and own client scale.
The court made several important observations: (1) Reasons for judgments serve broader purposes beyond enabling appeals - they assure the public that courts act deliberately rather than arbitrarily and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice (citing former Chief Justice Corbett). (2) While a de bonis propriis costs order against a legal practitioner may be appropriate for egregious conduct, procedural fairness requires that the practitioner be afforded an opportunity to be heard and legally represented before such an order is made. (3) The court expressed strong disapproval of casual, disrespectful communication with the court, particularly dismissing judicial reasoning as obviously wrong or describing one's own ill-informed legal opinion as "trite law." (4) The court noted the ongoing systemic difficulties with the implementation of CaseLines in the Eastern Cape Division despite its "passionately celebrated launching." (5) Where an organ of state's tender processes are challenged, there is a strong public interest in having the substantive review determined expeditiously without interruption by interlocutory appeals. (6) An unsuccessful party in interim proceedings who is ultimately vindicated in the main proceedings retains the right not only to costs but potentially to damages for any harm suffered during the period of interim relief.
This judgment reinforces several important procedural principles in South African law: (1) the fundamental importance of judicial reasons and the impropriety of seeking leave to appeal before reasons are provided when they have been requested; (2) the limited appealability of interim orders and the primacy of the "interests of justice" test post-City of Tshwane; (3) the strict requirements under section 18(2) of the Superior Courts Act for suspending interim orders pending appeal; and (4) the court's willingness to impose punitive costs for abuse of process and disrespectful conduct toward the court. The judgment provides a comprehensive articulation of the policy reasons for requiring written reasons (maintaining public confidence, ensuring considered decision-making, facilitating appeals) and demonstrates the court's intolerance for tactical litigation designed to frustrate execution of court orders. It also illustrates the court's inherent power to regulate proceedings and sanction unprofessional conduct through costs orders and referrals to regulatory bodies.