On 13 June 2006, the respondent (Amber Sunrise Properties) attended a public auction conducted by the third appellant (Aucor Sandton), where the Withoek properties owned by the first and second appellants were being sold. Dr Mohamed Adam, representing the respondent, made the highest bid and signed the 'Agreement and Conditions of Sale'. The agreement provided that the sale was 'provisionally sold to the highest bidder subject to confirmation of the sale by the Seller within seven (7) days'. On 20 June 2006 (within the seven-day period), Mr Van Rensburg, acting for the sellers, signed the agreement confirming the sale. However, the respondent was not notified of this confirmation until early July 2006, outside the seven-day period. The respondent paid a deposit of R454,290 but subsequently applied to the High Court to have the agreement declared of no force and effect and for repayment of the deposit. The sellers opposed and brought a counter-application for a declaration that the agreement was valid and for an order directing the respondent to pay the balance of the purchase price.
The appeal was upheld. The order of the High Court was set aside. The respondent's application was dismissed with costs. The counter-application was upheld, declaring the agreement to be of full force and effect. The respondent was ordered to furnish a bank guarantee or pay the balance of the purchase price within 30 days, and the sellers were ordered to effect transfer upon receipt of payment. The respondent was ordered to pay interest a tempore morae at 15.5% from 20 June 2006 and to pay costs on an attorney-client scale.
1. A provision in a contract of sale that gives the seller an unfettered and unlimited discretion whether to sell or not constitutes a pure potestative condition which is invalid in law, and accordingly no contract of sale comes into existence. 2. Where parties reduce their agreement to writing and provision is made for the offeree to sign and specify the date and place of signature, this constitutes an indication that the mode of acceptance prescribed is the signature itself, and there is no requirement for the acceptance to be communicated to the offeror. 3. In determining the mode of acceptance required, each case depends on the terms of the particular offer. Where the offer takes the form of a written contract signed by the offeror with provision for the offeree to specify the date of signature, the inference will readily arise that the mode of acceptance is no more than the offeree's signature. 4. The purpose of reducing a contract to writing is to achieve certainty and facilitate proof; this purpose would be defeated if the time and place of conclusion were to be determined by evidence aliunde rather than from the document itself.
The court noted that by reason of section 3 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, the sale in question was not required to be in writing and signed by the parties. The mere fact that the sellers were to sign at a later date would not on that account have precluded a contract of sale from coming into existence. The court also made general observations about the importance of certainty in commercial transactions and the rationale for specifying dates and places of signature in written contracts, endorsing the views expressed in Reid v Jeffreys Bay Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd regarding the inherent improbability that parties to a written contract would intend the time and place of conclusion to be determined otherwise than from the document itself.
This case provides important guidance on the distinction between conditional sales and offers to purchase in South African contract law, particularly in the context of auction sales. It clarifies that provisions reserving unlimited discretion to a seller constitute pure potestative conditions that are invalid and prevent a contract from coming into existence. The case is significant for establishing when communication of acceptance is not required: where a written contract provides for the offeree to sign and specify the date of signature, this constitutes the prescribed mode of acceptance and no further communication is necessary. The judgment emphasizes the importance of certainty in commercial transactions and the purpose of reducing contracts to writing. It confirms that the date and place of signature in a written contract normally determine when and where the contract was concluded, avoiding disputes that would defeat the purpose of written agreements.