William Nengwekuru v Commissioner General of Police N.O. and Police Service Commission N.O.

The applicant, William Nengwekuru, was a former member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police who was discharged from the police service following disciplinary proceedings. He filed an internal appeal to the Police Service Commission (second respondent), which was dismissed. The applicant was notified of the dismissal on 1 April 2025. The applicant only instituted review proceedings in mid-June 2025, beyond the 8-week time limit prescribed by Rule 62(4) of the High Court Rules, 2021 (which expired on 27 May 2025). The opposing affidavit filed by the respondents was commissioned by Mr. Fanuel Kapasura, a legal practitioner employed by the first respondent (Commissioner-General of Police), who was actively involved in the matter on the respondents' side.

• Whether an affidavit commissioned by a legal practitioner employed by a party to the proceedings and involved in the matter is admissible
• Whether the constitutional right to administrative justice under section 68 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 exempts a litigant from complying with procedural time limits in Rule 62(4) of the High Court Rules, 2021
• Whether the applicant's review application was instituted out of time
• Whether the delay in communicating the appeal decision constituted a reviewable irregularity
• Whether the applicant established grounds for review of the Police Service Commission's decision

The application for review was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to bear the costs of the application on the ordinary scale.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) An affidavit commissioned by a Commissioner of Oaths who has an interest in the proceedings (such as a legal practitioner employed by and acting for one of the parties) is inadmissible and must be struck out. (2) The constitutional right to administrative justice under section 68 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 does not exempt a litigant from complying with procedural time limits prescribed by the High Court Rules. (3) A litigant who proceeds by way of review application under the High Court's review jurisdiction is bound by Rule 62(4) of the High Court Rules, 2021, which requires such proceedings to be instituted within 8 weeks of the termination of the proceedings in which the irregularity occurred, unless the court extends time for good cause shown. (4) Where no application for condonation or extension of time is made and no good cause is shown, a review application instituted beyond the 8-week time limit is not properly before the court and must be dismissed. (5) Administrative delay in communicating a decision, without more (such as prejudice or substantive unfairness), does not constitute a reviewable irregularity warranting setting aside the decision.

The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The court noted that the right to administrative justice "cuts both ways" – it expects administrators to act without undue delay, and implicitly calls upon aggrieved persons to seek redress without undue delay as well, so that administrative decisions are challenged while still fresh. (2) The court observed that the appropriate remedy for undue administrative delay would typically be an order compelling a decision within a specified timeframe (if the decision were still pending) or possibly an award of costs if the delay was egregious, rather than setting aside a decision already made. (3) The court commented that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, and courts must guard against even the appearance of bias. (4) The court distinguished the Constitutional Court decision in Erica Ndewere v The President of Zimbabwe CCZ 3/25 (2025), noting it dealt with a unique situation of presidential removal of a judge and did not address the effect of Rule 62(4)'s time limit. (5) The court noted that even where an application is formally unopposed (due to striking out the opposition), the court must still satisfy itself that the applicant has made a case for relief, as the remedy of review is discretionary.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and constitutional law for several reasons: (1) It reinforces the strict rule that affidavits must be commissioned by independent, impartial Commissioners of Oaths with no interest in the proceedings, and that affidavits commissioned by a party's own legal representatives or employees are inadmissible. (2) It establishes that the constitutional right to administrative justice under section 68 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 does not automatically exempt litigants from complying with procedural time limits and other rules of court. (3) It clarifies that litigants who choose to proceed by way of review application are bound by the procedural rules governing such applications, including the 8-week time limit in Rule 62(4) of the High Court Rules, 2021. (4) It demonstrates the interplay between constitutional rights and procedural compliance, holding that the Constitution and the Administrative Justice Act are complementary to, not a substitute for, ordinary review processes. (5) It sets standards for what constitutes a reviewable irregularity, confirming that dissatisfaction with an outcome and administrative delay in notification do not, without more, constitute grounds for judicial intervention.