Watmore Chipendo v The State

In September 2008, the appellant represented to Emmanuel Nyanyiwa (a relative) that he was selling Stand Number 452 Chidzidzi, Mutoko, which had an uncompleted building structure. Based on this representation, Nyanyiwa paid the appellant US$8,000 in tranches at different places over a period of time, believing he had purchased the stand. The "sale" was oral, with no written agreement or receipts issued for the payments, though the appellant acknowledged receipt via SMS. On 9 June 2010, the appellant sold the same stand to Marybar Bvunzawabaya for US$6,000, executing an affidavit to effect transfer to Bvunzawabaya. When Nyanyiwa discovered this, he reported the matter to police as fraud.

• Whether the appellant fraudulently misrepresented to Nyanyiwa that he was selling the stand when he had no intention to do so
• Whether the trial magistrate correctly identified the victim of the fraud
• Whether the essential elements of fraud (unlawful, intentional misrepresentation calculated to cause prejudice) were established
• Whether the sentence imposed was appropriate

The appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed in its entirety. The conviction for fraud under section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act was upheld, as was the sentence of 24 months imprisonment with 6 months suspended for 5 years on conditions of good behaviour.

The binding legal principle is that the offence of fraud consists of: (a) unlawful; (b) intentional; (c) misrepresentation of facts (distortion of truth); (d) calculated to prejudice another. Intent in the form of dolus eventualis is sufficient. The perpetrator must be aware that the misrepresentation is false (intention to deceive) and must intend to induce someone to follow a course of action that is prejudicial as a result of the misrepresentation. It is irrelevant to the inquiry into whether the appellant intended to defraud that the appellant could, if he wished, carry out the promise given to induce the victim to act to his prejudice. The fraud is complete when the victim parts with property based on the misrepresentation, and the victim is the person so induced, not a subsequent third party who may also be affected by the accused's conduct.

The court observed that had there been a written agreement of sale for the initial sale to Nyanyiwa, it could arguably have been contended that the subsequent sale to Bvunzawabaya was the fraud. The court also noted that the appellant's conduct of avoiding making public his receipt of payments and failing to issue receipts was indicative of his fraudulent intent from the outset. The court commented that the trial magistrate's reasoning that invoked section 138(c) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act was unnecessary as the charge was properly framed.

This case clarifies the essential elements of fraud under Zimbabwean criminal law, particularly regarding misrepresentation and intention to defraud. It establishes that fraud is complete when the accused obtains money or property through misrepresentation with the intention to deceive, regardless of whether the accused could theoretically fulfill the promise made. The case emphasizes that the victim of fraud is the person who parts with property based on the misrepresentation, not necessarily a subsequent third party. It also confirms that mens rea in the form of dolus eventualis is sufficient to prove fraud, and that the relevant inquiry is whether the accused intended to deceive at the time of the misrepresentation, not whether he had the capacity to perform the promised act.