Vaganathan Pillay v Ewart Hadebe

The applicant, Vaganathan Pillay, is the registered owner of a unit in Casa Fortuna, a sectional title community scheme in Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal. The respondent, Ewart Hadebe, is also a unit owner and a trustee of the body corporate. The dispute arose from events at general meetings held on 10 September 2022 and 17 September 2022. The applicant alleged that at the 10 September meeting the respondent improperly sided with the chairperson, Thomas Hadebe, in postponing the meeting on the basis that there was no quorum, despite the applicant asserting that a quorum existed. The applicant further alleged that at the 17 September meeting, when his motion to remove trustees was to be discussed, the respondent raised irrelevant matters from previous financial periods to derail the motion and thereby deny him his rights under the prescribed management rules. The respondent denied wrongdoing, contending that the applicant had provided no proof that he had improperly influenced the chairperson, that the applicant had failed to return the attendance register for quorum verification, and that the chairperson made the decision to call off the meeting. The respondent also raised concerns about the applicant's prior conduct as former trustee and managing agent, including alleged failure to hand over records and outstanding levies. The matter proceeded to adjudication after conciliation failed.

• Whether the respondent's conduct in supporting or expressing agreement with the postponement of the 10 September 2022 meeting constituted a nuisance under section 39(2)(a) of the CSOS Act.
• Whether the applicant established grounds for an order under section 39(4)(b) declaring that a meeting was not validly convened.
• Whether the applicant identified and proved a motion or resolution justifying relief under section 39(4)(d) or section 39(4)(e) of the CSOS Act.
• Whether the adjudicator could grant residual relief under section 39(7)(b) in the absence of defined and supported submissions.
• Whether the application was misconceived in part for want of factual particularity and supporting evidence.

The adjudicator refused the relief sought under section 39(2)(a) of the CSOS Act. The application for relief under section 39(4)(b), (d) and (e), as well as section 39(7)(b), was dismissed, with the meeting-related relief dismissed as misconceived in terms of section 53(1)(a). No order as to costs was made.

For purposes of section 39(2)(a) of the CSOS Act, conduct at a body corporate meeting such as expressing support for a chairperson's view on quorum does not constitute a nuisance unless it amounts to unreasonable interference of the kind recognised in nuisance law. Further, relief under section 39(4)(b), (d) or (e) requires the applicant to identify the impugned meeting, motion, or resolution with sufficient specificity and to provide supporting evidence demonstrating invalid convening, unreasonable opposition, or unreasonable interference with rights. In the absence of such evidence and particularity, the application may be refused or dismissed as misconceived under section 53(1)(a).

The adjudicator observed, by way of general explanation, that nuisance in sectional title schemes commonly involves matters such as obstruction of parking, loud noise, improper conduct, or substance use on common property, and referred to PMR 30 as reinforcing the position regarding nuisance in a scheme context. The adjudicator also noted the applicant's responsibility under the CSOS Practice Directive to ensure that all relevant information is placed before the tribunal, and recorded the statutory right of appeal to the High Court on a question of law under section 57 of the CSOS Act.

This decision is significant in the community schemes context because it illustrates the limits of CSOS relief and the importance of properly characterising disputes under the statutory remedies in section 39 of the CSOS Act. It confirms that not every disagreement or participation in a contentious meeting amounts to a legally cognisable nuisance, and that applicants must provide concrete documentary support and identify with precision the meeting, motion, or resolution impugned. The case also underscores the adjudicator's inability to grant vague or unsupported relief outside the established statutory framework.