The second appellant (Latu Robson Helmon Khumalo) ruled the Amantungwa tribal community in the Utrecht district of KwaZulu-Natal. He was the great-grandson of the late Chief Qomintaba Khumalo. After Chief William Khumalo died in 1963, leaving four sons (Johan Madende, Gadi, Girsten and Mgobo), two acting chiefs served until 1982. On 31 October 1984, a clan meeting unanimously nominated the second appellant and requested that he be appointed as a fully-fledged chief. However, he was only appointed as "temporary Chief" under section 2(8) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 on 20 March 1986. He ruled for over 20 years until 10 October 2007, when he received a letter from the first respondent (MEC) stating that the Executive Council had decided to terminate his services as Acting Chief and appoint the second respondent (Patrick Khumalo, son of Mgobo) as Chief of Amantungwa, effective 31 October 2007. The appellants sought to review and set aside this decision, arguing the second appellant had been appointed as chief (not acting chief) and that the Umndeni (royal family) was not consulted regarding the second respondent's appointment.
The appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) An appointment as "acting chief" or "temporary chief" under section 2(8) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 does not transform into an appointment as chief by operation of law or through the passage of time, even with the advent of constitutionalism and new legislation. (2) When a successor to a traditional leadership position has been properly identified and recognized in accordance with statutory requirements, the duties of an acting chief come to an end automatically upon the successor assuming office; this does not constitute "removal" requiring grounds under section 21 of the Governance Act. (3) Section 19 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 5 of 2005 imposes peremptory procedural requirements for the appointment of traditional leaders: the Umndeni wenkosi must identify a person who qualifies under customary law, provide reasons for that identification to the Premier, and the Premier must then recognize that person. These steps are mandatory. (4) The Premier, as the statutory decision-maker empowered to recognize and appoint traditional leaders under section 19 of the Governance Act, has a direct and substantial interest in proceedings seeking to set aside such an appointment and must be joined as a party. Failure to join the Premier is fatal to an application seeking to review and set aside the appointment of a traditional leader. (5) The principle in Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637(A) applies: joinder depends not on the nature of the subject-matter but on the manner and extent to which the court's order may affect the interests of third parties. A party directly affected by a ruling must be joined.
The court made several important non-binding observations: (1) Mpati P expressed sympathy for the appellants' position, noting that "the appointment of the second respondent as Chief of Amantungwa, which resulted in the termination of the second appellant's services as acting chief, was flawed for want of compliance with the peremptory procedure provided for in s19 of the Governance Act." (2) The court observed that "the appellants were justifiably aggrieved by the actions of the Executive Council" and therefore should not be burdened with a costs order despite losing the appeal. (3) The court noted that there was "no clear and acceptable evidence to show that the Umndeni of Amantungwa ever met to discuss the second respondent's proposed identification as Chief of Amantungwa" and that "a mere expression of wishes by an unknown number of unidentified members of Umndeni of Amantungwa that the second respondent be appointed a chief does not translate into an identification of a successor for recognition and appointment as envisaged by the provisions of s19 of the Governance Act." (4) The court acknowledged the Zulu customary law of hereditary succession and accepted Professor Mathenjwa's explanation that succession operates through the eldest son of the indlunkulu (great house), then through subsequent sons and their descendants in order of seniority. (5) The court observed that "customary law does not override legislative enactments" in the context of traditional leadership appointments. (6) There was implicit criticism of the administrative process followed by the Department, particularly the reliance on two undated letters from family members without proper evidence of a formal identification process by the Umndeni.
This case is significant in South African customary law and administrative law for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the distinction between acting chiefs and chiefs, and the legal consequences of each appointment. (2) It emphasizes the importance of strict compliance with statutory procedures for the recognition and appointment of traditional leaders under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 and provincial legislation. (3) It confirms that the peremptory requirements of section 19 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 5 of 2005, including proper identification by the Umndeni wenkosi (royal family), must be followed. (4) It establishes that customary law does not override legislative enactments regarding traditional leadership. (5) It demonstrates the critical importance of proper joinder in administrative review proceedings – particularly that the decision-maker (in this case the Premier) must be joined when their decision is sought to be set aside. (6) It provides guidance on Zulu laws of hereditary succession and the role of the royal family in identifying successors. The case illustrates the tension between traditional customary practices and modern statutory frameworks governing traditional leadership.