Trustees for the Time Being of the Humane Society International - Africa Trust and Others v Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment and Another

On 10 March 2022, the Humane Society International - Africa Trust and its trustees (the applicants) launched a two-part application to review and set aside the Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment's decision to allocate hunting and export quotas for elephant, black rhinoceros, and leopard for the 2022 calendar year. Interim relief was granted by Gamble J on 21 April 2022, restraining implementation of the quotas. The applicants later amended their notice of motion to add 'expanded relief' seeking a broad interdict applicable to all Threatened or Protected Species (TOPS) listed species. The impugned decision was purportedly made under the CITES Regulations, though there was confusion about the precise empowering provision relied upon. The 2022 calendar year ended, and the quotas were never implemented due to the interim interdict.

• Whether the review of the Minister's 2022 quota decision was moot since the 2022 calendar year had lapsed and the decision was never implemented.
• Whether the High Court sitting as a court of first instance has a discretion to determine a matter that has become moot.
• Whether the applicants had made out a proper case for a final interdict in respect of all TOPS listed species (beyond leopard, black rhinoceros, and elephant).
• Whether the terms of the interdictory relief sought were impermissibly vague and imprecise.

Part B of the application was dismissed. The first respondent was ordered to pay costs occasioned by the condonation application. Each party was to pay its own costs in Part B. The first respondent was ordered to pay 60% of the applicants' costs in Part A (including costs of two counsel).

The High Court sitting as a court of first instance has no overriding discretion to decide a case that has become moot — a matter is not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy. A final interdict requires proof of an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and this must be established for each species or category of relief sought. Court orders must be clear, accessible, and not 'indeterminate, open ended and irredeemably vague' so that litigants required to comply know with clarity what is required of them.

The court noted that there were complex and important legal questions regarding the interrelationship between the Biodiversity Act, the TOPS Regulations, the CITES Regulations, and CITES Conference of Parties Resolutions, but refrained from deciding these as the matter was moot. The court also observed that even if it had a discretion to hear moot matters, it would not have exercised it because the Minister indicated the 2023 process differed from the 2021 process, making it unclear whether a judgment would provide guidance.

This case confirms and applies the principle from Minister of Justice v Stransham-Ford (SCA) that the High Court, unlike appeal courts, has no overriding discretion to hear moot matters. It reinforces the requirements for final interdicts in environmental law — applicants must plead and prove a reasonable apprehension of injury for each species affected, and cannot seek broad relief across all TOPS-listed species based on evidence relating only to three species. It also highlights the importance of precision in court orders affecting complex regulatory frameworks.