Tracey Lee Telford v Trustees of Sitari Country Estate Homeowners Association

The applicant, Tracey Lee Telford, is the registered owner of Unit 4 in Sitari Country Estate, a community scheme administered by the respondent homeowners association (HOA). On 23 February 2023 the respondent notified residents by email of a levy increase of more than 30%, to be implemented after five days' notice. The applicant objected and asked why no meeting had been convened to discuss the increase, when promised facilities would become available, and requested a copy of the board minutes in which the levy increase had been discussed. The respondent, through its managing agents, explained the reasons for the increase and offered the applicant access to inspect the minutes at its offices, but did not provide copies in the form requested by the applicant. The applicant then brought a CSOS application seeking relief under sections 39(1)(c), 39(4)(a), 39(6)(b)(ii) and 39(7)(a) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011, challenging the levy increase, seeking an order to compel a general meeting, reimbursement for repairs, and access to documents.

• Whether the levy increase imposed by the HOA was incorrectly determined or unreasonable under section 39(1)(c) of the CSOS Act.
• Whether the applicant was entitled to an order compelling the HOA to call a general meeting under section 39(4)(a) despite not meeting the constitutional threshold for members to convene such a meeting.
• Whether the applicant had made out a case for reimbursement for repairs under section 39(6)(b)(ii), and whether such relief was competent against the respondent HOA trustees.
• Whether the applicant had been wrongfully denied access to information or documents, particularly trustees' meeting minutes, under section 39(7)(a) of the CSOS Act.
• Whether the respondent acted within the authority conferred by the HOA constitution in determining levies and regulating access to records.

The adjudicator dismissed all relief sought by the applicant under sections 39(1)(c), 39(4)(a), 39(6)(b) and 39(7)(a) of the CSOS Act as misconceived in terms of section 53(1)(a). No order as to costs was made.

Where an HOA constitution expressly authorises the board to impose levies, and does not require prior consultation or a members' meeting, a levy increase is not incorrectly determined or unreasonable merely because a member objects to it. A member seeking to compel the convening of a general meeting must satisfy the scheme constitution's threshold requirements. Relief under section 39 of the CSOS Act must be properly substantiated and directed against the correct person contemplated by the statute. An applicant is not 'wrongfully denied' access to documents where the association offers reasonable access in accordance with its constitution and applicable company law, but the applicant rejects that mode of access.

The adjudicator observed that even if the applicant had substantiated the repairs claim, section 39(6)(b)(ii) appeared not to permit such relief against the respondent trustees in their representative capacity as the scheme's governance structure. The adjudicator also remarked more generally that CSOS is a creature of statute and adjudicators are confined to granting competent and enforceable orders under the Act. No further substantial obiter appears beyond these observations.

The decision is significant in the community schemes context because it reinforces that HOA powers and member rights are primarily determined by the scheme's constitution and rules, and that CSOS adjudicators will not interfere where trustees act within those powers. It also confirms that disagreement with a levy increase does not by itself establish unreasonableness, that members must comply with constitutional thresholds for convening meetings, and that access to scheme records may be regulated by the constitution and company law provided access is not actually refused. The order further illustrates the CSOS principle that only competent statutory remedies may be granted.