Toronto Body Corporate v Ayanda Ntlokwana and Andisa Ntsila

The applicant, Toronto Body Corporate, is the body corporate of a sectional title scheme in Navalsig, Bloemfontein. The first respondent, Ayanda Ntlokwana, is the owner of Unit 11, and the second respondent, Andisa Ntsila, is the tenant occupying that unit. The dispute arose because the second respondent repeatedly parked a business trailer/food truck in a visitors’ parking bay from about December 2021. The body corporate contended that this conduct contravened the scheme’s conduct rules, which prohibit the parking of trailers and the use of visitors’ bays by owners or occupiers without prior written consent of the trustees. The applicant notified the first respondent of the breach in February 2022 and sent a warning letter in March 2022. The first respondent then sought permission on 29 March 2022 to use the visitors’ bay for the trailer, and permission was granted on 4 April 2022 subject to conditions, including cost implications. The respondents rejected those conditions but continued occasionally to park the trailer in the visitors’ bay. The second respondent stated that she believed the visitors’ bay adjacent to Unit 11’s allocated bay formed part of the unit’s allocation and that the trailer did not fit in the allocated shaded bay due to its length. Internal remedies were exhausted, conciliation failed, and the matter proceeded to adjudication under the CSOS Act.

• Whether the repeated parking of the second respondent’s trailer in a visitors’ parking bay, without written consent of the trustees, contravened the scheme’s conduct rules.
• Whether that conduct constituted a nuisance or unreasonable interference within the meaning of section 39(2)(a) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011.
• Whether the adjudicator had jurisdiction under the CSOS Act to grant behavioural relief requiring the respondent to refrain from such conduct.
• Whether a costs order should be made in the circumstances.

The application was granted. The second respondent was prohibited, with effect from the date of the order, from parking her trailer in a visitors’ parking bay without the written permission of the trustees. No order as to costs was made.

Where a sectional title scheme’s conduct rules prohibit the parking of trailers on common property and the use of visitors’ parking bays by owners or occupiers without prior written consent, the repeated parking of a trailer in a visitors’ bay without such consent constitutes a breach of the rules and may amount to a nuisance if, objectively assessed, it unreasonably interferes with the orderly use and enjoyment of common property. In such circumstances, CSOS may grant a behavioural order under section 39(2)(a) of the CSOS Act requiring the respondent to refrain from that conduct.

The adjudicator made broader observations on the nature of nuisance in South African law, including that not every inconvenience is actionable and that some annoyance must be tolerated under the principle of 'give and take, live and let live'. The adjudicator also commented that CSOS, being a creature of statute, has powers confined to section 39 of the CSOS Act, citing Evergreen Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Messerschmidt and The Kingshaven Homeowners Association v Botha. In addition, the adjudicator noted generally that costs orders are not usually made in section 54 determinations unless the circumstances contemplated in section 53 are present.

This decision is significant within South African community schemes jurisprudence because it illustrates the CSOS’s power under section 39(2)(a) of the CSOS Act to regulate behavioural disputes in sectional title schemes where conduct rules are breached and the conduct constitutes a nuisance. It confirms that repeated unauthorised use of visitors’ parking and parking of trailers on common property can amount to an objectively unreasonable interference with scheme management and communal rights. The decision also reflects the application of common-law nuisance principles, adapted to the sectional title context, and reinforces that CSOS adjudicators’ remedial powers are confined to the statutory framework.