The Trustees for the Time Being of the East London Hebrew Congregation v Chanoch Galperin and Others

The applicant, the East London Hebrew Congregation, sought eviction of the first and second respondents (Rabbi Galperin and his spouse) from property at 7 Osborne Road, Selborne, East London. The first respondent had been employed as the Congregation's rabbi under a fixed-term contract from 1 June 2016. His employment was terminated on 3 February 2020 following a disciplinary enquiry into misconduct allegations. The respondents' right to occupy the property was incidental to the employment contract. After dismissal, the respondents continued occupying the property without paying rent. Hartle J had previously found the respondents to be unlawful occupiers and stayed the eviction pending: (a) determination of the first respondent's appeal; (b) adjudication by the Beth-Din of the dismissal dispute; or (c) mediation. By 27 October 2023, all appeal processes (including to the Constitutional Court) had been exhausted unsuccessfully. The matter was re-enrolled for fresh consideration of sections 4(7) and 4(8) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The respondents were elderly persons in their sixties who claimed they lacked financial means to secure alternative accommodation.

• Whether it was just and equitable to grant an eviction order under section 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998
• What would constitute a just and equitable date for the respondents to vacate the property under section 4(8)
• Whether determination of the labour dispute was a precondition for eviction
• What weight should be given to the respondents' age, financial circumstances, and potential homelessness in the just and equitable enquiry
• The scope of reconsideration following a stayed eviction order

1. The first and second respondents and all persons occupying through them are evicted from 7 Osborne Road, Selborne, East London. 2. The respondents must vacate by 12h00 on 4 April 2025. 3. If the respondents do not vacate, the sheriff is authorized to evict them. 4. The first and second respondents are ordered to pay costs jointly and/or severally on a party-and-party basis, including reserved costs and costs of the first section 4(2) application, but excluding costs of the second section 4(2) application. 5. Counsel fees to be taxed on scale C.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Under PIE, where a prior court has determined that occupiers are unlawful and procedural requirements have been met, a subsequent court hearing the matter after a stay cannot reconsider those foundational findings. (2) The determination of a labour dispute is not a precondition for evicting an employee whose right to occupy property is subsidiary to an employment contract that has been factually terminated. (3) In the just and equitable enquiry under section 4(7) of PIE, occupiers bear a positive duty (through their legal representatives) to place full and proper information before the court regarding their personal circumstances, particularly evidence of potential homelessness, financial situation, health, disabilities, dependants, and efforts to secure alternative accommodation. (4) Where occupiers claim financial hardship but demonstrate ability to fund extensive legal representation and pay for services, a court may justifiably conclude their claims are not credible and their opposition is not genuine. (5) PIE is designed to protect vulnerable persons at genuine risk of homelessness, not persons with resources who engage in strategic litigation to indefinitely delay eviction. (6) Private property owners who are not organs of state have no constitutional obligation to provide housing indefinitely, though they may be required to submit to reasonable delays to accommodate immediate needs of occupiers. (7) The just and equitable enquiry cannot operate to indefinitely deprive owners of property rights through disguised expropriation without compensation.

The court observed that the approach taken by the first respondent in attempting to relitigate disputes regarding his dismissal and inheritance matters appeared designed to engineer further delays and preserve the status quo rather than genuinely engage with the eviction proceedings. The court noted that the first respondent's shifting positions regarding whether the employment contract still existed or was unlawfully terminated, combined with strategic avoidance of claiming unfair dismissal under labour law procedures, suggested the defence was not advanced in good faith. Rugunanan J commented that the "oversubtle reach" in the respondents' heads of argument may have been intended to "set up points to be taken on appeal and in that way preserve the status quo for the respondents' continued holding over leaving the right of the Congregation to reclaim its property, unresolved indefinitely." The court expressed the view that three weeks (proposed by the Congregation) would be inadequate time for persons who had occupied property for a substantial period to organize relocation, even where no genuine homelessness risk existed, and that approximately three months represented an appropriate balance recognizing that eviction would be "a thunderclap."

This case clarifies important principles regarding eviction applications under PIE where occupation was initially lawful but became unlawful following termination of an employment contract. It establishes that: (1) determination of labour disputes is not a precondition for eviction where the right to occupy is subsidiary to employment; (2) the expiry of a fixed-term employment contract is a relevant factor that limits the utility of pursuing reinstatement; (3) occupiers opposing eviction have a positive duty through their legal representatives to place full and proper information before the court regarding their circumstances, particularly concerning homelessness risk; (4) bald assertions of lack of means without supporting detail may lead to adverse inferences; (5) the ability to afford extensive legal representation contradicts claims of poverty; (6) private property owners (particularly voluntary associations) are not obliged to provide accommodation indefinitely but must submit to some reasonable delay; (7) PIE is intended to protect vulnerable persons at genuine risk of homelessness, not to permit indefinite holding over by those with resources. The judgment reinforces that while courts must conduct a just and equitable enquiry, this cannot operate to indefinitely deprive owners of their property rights through a form of disguised expropriation without compensation.