The State v Sheila Ndlovu

The accused and her husband Baron Chigudu were employed as domestic workers by the deceased. On 15 December 2022, they hatched a plan to kill the deceased to steal his property and raise money to buy a taxi. On 28 December 2022, when the deceased visited his farm to attend to cattle, Baron attacked and killed him with an axe. The accused brought the axe to the scene, encouraged her husband to finish off the deceased, and assisted in tying the body to the deceased's vehicle. They drove the body to a disused mine shaft 20 meters deep and threw it in, along with other items including the murder weapon, to conceal the crime. They then hired a transporter for US$70 to remove property worth US$7,811 from the deceased's home, including household goods, tools, a trailer, and other items. The body was later recovered from the mine shaft with police assistance. The post-mortem revealed death caused by severe head trauma with multiple skull fractures. The accused gave a detailed warned and cautioned statement admitting her participation throughout the planning and execution of the murder.

• Whether the accused was guilty of murder as a co-perpetrator under section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act
• Whether the defence of compulsion under section 243 of the Criminal Law Code applied to the accused's actions
• What is the appropriate sentence for murder committed with premeditation and aggravating circumstances

The accused was found guilty of murder as defined in section 47(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.

Under section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, where two or more persons commit a crime in association and each possesses the requisite mens rea (whether intention, knowledge, or realization of real risk), they may be convicted as co-perpetrators, and the conduct of the actual perpetrator is deemed to be the conduct of every co-perpetrator, whether or not their conduct directly contributed to the commission of the crime. The defence of compulsion under section 243 requires proof of actual threats of death, serious bodily harm or financial loss that are imminent or have begun, that the accused could not escape, and that the accused's conduct did no more harm than necessary to avert the threat. Mere assertion of compulsion without evidence of threats, particularly where the accused had opportunity to withdraw, voluntarily participated in planning and execution, and was motivated by greed, will not establish the defence.

The court observed that women are usually treated with some measure of leniency in sentencing. However, the court commented that "a woman is supposed to have a nurturing character, gentle and kind hearted" and noted the accused did not show any of these traits. The court further observed that the accused's status as a woman does not justify departure from the appropriate penalty where the offence involves significant aggravating circumstances. The court also made the general observation that no one jokes about killing someone, rejecting the accused's claim that she did not take the murder plan seriously when it was first discussed. These comments about expected feminine characteristics and gender-based sentencing considerations, while influencing the court's reasoning, constitute obiter dicta as they are not essential to the legal determination of guilt or the binding sentencing principles.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal law as it demonstrates the application of section 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act regarding co-perpetrators in murder cases. It clarifies that all participants in a planned murder can be convicted as co-perpetrators regardless of who struck the fatal blow, provided each had the requisite mens rea. The judgment also provides important guidance on when the defence of compulsion under section 243 will fail, particularly where the accused had opportunities to withdraw from the plan, actively contributed to its execution, and was motivated by personal gain rather than fear. The case illustrates that gender-based leniency in sentencing will not apply where aggravating circumstances such as premeditation, murder for gain, and concealment of evidence are present.