The State v Christine Krisjan

A 14-year-old child was convicted of murder for the stabbing death of another 14-year-old boy. The child was 12 years old at the time of the alleged offence. The child, who was legally represented, initially pleaded guilty to murder, but his legal representative indicated this was not in accordance with instructions and that the child intended to plead guilty to culpable homicide. A section 112(2) statement was read into the record wherein the child stated he wrongfully and negligently stabbed the deceased after being pushed and hit, admitting he was angry, fetched a knife to scare the deceased, and struck a blow but did not intend to kill. The prosecutor accepted the plea to culpable homicide. However, the magistrate rejected the plea, stating it was "not holding up" even for culpable homicide. After a meeting in chambers between the magistrate, prosecutor and legal representative (not placed on record), the child made section 220 admissions that he stabbed the deceased on the chest with a knife and foresaw he might kill him. The magistrate convicted the child of murder. The Regional Magistrate sent the matter on special review, stating she erred in convicting the child of murder when he had pleaded to culpable homicide.

• Whether the magistrate had the power to reject the plea of guilty to culpable homicide after the State had accepted it and restricted the lis
• Whether the State proved the child's criminal capacity beyond reasonable doubt as required by sections 7(2) and 11(1) of the Child Justice Act
• Whether the presiding officer complied with section 63(3) of the Child Justice Act by personally informing and explaining the child's rights and procedures
• Whether the section 112(2) statement was sufficient to sustain a conviction for culpable homicide
• Whether the section 220 admissions were sufficient to warrant a conviction for murder

The proceedings and conviction for murder under case number S/R 1/2025 in the Regional Court sitting in Fort Beaufort were reviewed and set aside. If the prosecuting authority decides to prosecute the child de novo, the proceedings must be heard by a different magistrate. The Registrar was requested to forward the judgment to the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and the child's legal representative.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Once the State accepts a plea of guilty to an alternative charge or competent verdict and thereby restricts the lis, the court has no power to reject that plea - rejection constitutes a gross irregularity (applying Tshilidzi v S); (2) In terms of sections 7(2) and 11(1) of the Child Justice Act, children aged 12-14 years are presumed to lack criminal capacity, and the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the child had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and to act in accordance with that appreciation - failure to prove criminal capacity renders the conviction invalid; (3) Section 63(3) of the Child Justice Act requires the presiding officer personally to inform the child of the nature of allegations, rights, and further procedures in the prescribed manner set out in Regulation 37 - it is insufficient for the legal representative to confirm this has been done; (4) The Child Justice Act's objects of protecting children's rights and providing special treatment require strict procedural compliance with no shortcuts permitted.

The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The section 112(2) statement was insufficient to sustain a culpable homicide conviction as there was no elaboration of the bare admissions of negligence and unlawfulness, and causation of death was not admitted; (2) The section 220 admissions were insufficient to warrant a murder conviction as dolus eventualis was not fully admitted - while the child admitted foreseeing the possibility of causing death, he did not state that he reconciled himself to this possibility; (3) The court expressed concern about the conduct of the trial, particularly given the child's young age and the fact that the section 220 admissions were radically opposed to the section 112(2) statement; (4) The court was concerned that the prosecutor and legal representative had not served the best interests of the child, as a trial that began with acceptance of a culpable homicide plea effectively changed into a murder trial; (5) The court noted concern about what transpired in the chambers meeting, which was not placed on record, and which appeared to precipitate the child's section 220 admissions.

This case is significant in South African child justice jurisprudence as it reinforces the strict procedural protections afforded to child accused persons under the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. It emphasizes that: (1) courts have no power to reject a guilty plea once the State has accepted it and restricted the lis to a competent verdict; (2) the State bears the burden of proving criminal capacity beyond reasonable doubt for children aged 12-14 years, and failure to do so renders proceedings fatally defective; (3) compliance with section 63(3) of the Child Justice Act requires the presiding officer personally to inform and explain rights and procedures to child accused in the prescribed manner - delegation to legal representatives is insufficient; and (4) the objects of the Child Justice Act to protect children's rights and provide special treatment require strict adherence to procedural safeguards with no shortcuts permitted. The case serves as a reminder to judicial officers and prosecutors of their heightened duties when dealing with child accused persons.