The Road Accident Fund v Wayne Coughlan NO

Children's father died in August 2000 and their mother was killed in June 2002 as a pedestrian in a road collision. The RAF admitted 100% liability for the collision. Prior to her death, the mother had placed the children in the care of their grandparents (initially during imprisonment, then because she was unable to care for them, though she contributed financially when employed as a builder). After the mother's death, the grandmother applied to the Children's Court in August 2002 to be appointed as foster parent under the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, which entitled her to foster child grants under the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 (later replaced by Act 13 of 2004). The curator ad litem and RAF agreed quantum of damages for loss of support at R112,942, while foster child grants already paid totaled R146,790. The question for determination was whether foster child grants should be deducted from the damages award.

• Whether foster child grants paid under the Social Assistance Act should be deducted from damages awarded for loss of support against the Road Accident Fund
• Whether there is a material distinction between social assistance grants and foster child grants for purposes of deductibility
• Whether deduction of foster child grants from damages awards amounts to double compensation
• The application of the compensatory principle in delictual actions and the res inter alios acta doctrine

The appeal was upheld. The order of the Western Cape High Court was set aside and replaced with: "The foster child grants are to be taken into account in assessing the damages to be awarded for loss of support, and, since these exceed the amount agreed to be payable as damages by the defendant, no order as to payment is made." Each party to bear their own costs on appeal, and no costs ordered against the curator in the high court.

Foster child grants paid under the Social Assistance Act should, as a rule, be deducted from damages awarded for loss of support by the Road Accident Fund. There is no substantive distinction between child support grants and foster child grants - both serve to support children and must be used for the child's benefit. The compensatory nature of delictual actions requires that benefits which reduce a plaintiff's actual loss must result in corresponding reduction in damages to prevent double compensation. Where social assistance grants serve the same purpose as damages for loss of support would serve (providing financial support lost due to the deceased's death), and the grants would not have been claimed but for the death caused by the collision, they must be deducted to prevent unjustified double recovery at public expense.

The Court emphasized that its finding does not establish a general principle precluding damages awards where dependants receive social support grants. The determination must be fact-specific, involving considerations of public policy, reasonableness and justice. Where evidence shows social assistance grants are warranted and double compensation will not ensue, damages may still be appropriate. Courts must balance two conflicting policy considerations: preventing double compensation while not relieving wrongdoers of liability due to fortuitous benefits received by dependants. The Court noted it is difficult to identify a single jurisprudential principle governing deductibility questions, with courts historically applying a casuistic approach. The Court also confirmed that certain benefits (insurance moneys, pensions as defined in the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969) are not deductible by statute, but social assistance grants do not fall within these exceptions.

This case clarifies that foster child grants should generally be deducted from RAF damages awards for loss of support, overruling the approach in Makhuvela v RAF. It confirms there is no material distinction between social assistance grants and foster child grants for deductibility purposes. The judgment reinforces the fundamental compensatory principle in South African delict that plaintiffs should not receive double compensation for the same loss. It provides important guidance on when social assistance benefits should be deducted from damages awards, though emphasizing a fact-specific inquiry rather than rigid rules. The case is significant for RAF litigation and the intersection between social security benefits and delictual compensation, particularly affecting vulnerable dependants who may receive state support.