The Road Accident Fund v Teresa Doris Russell

On 16 August 1989, Michael Henry Russell sustained severe multiple injuries, including brain damage, in a motor vehicle collision. He was hospitalized and remained in a comatose state for approximately one month. After discharge, his personality completely transformed - from a wonderful husband and father to an intolerant, impatient, irritable person with angry outbursts. In November 1990, his wife admitted him to Morningside Nursing Home after two incidents suggesting suicide attempts (found on the roof and an apparent pill overdose). In January 1991, the deceased committed suicide by jumping from a second storey parapet of the nursing home, on the same day he was informed his prospects of recovery were nil. The respondent, his wife, instituted a damages action on behalf of their minor children for loss of support against the Road Accident Fund.

• Whether the death by suicide arose as a result of injuries sustained in the collision
• Whether the suicide constituted a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation
• Whether factual causation (causa sine qua non) was established
• Whether legal causation was established between the collision and the suicide
• Whether a person with impaired mind and judgment who commits suicide can be said to have acted voluntarily so as to constitute a novus actus interveniens

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The appellant (Road Accident Fund) was held liable to compensate the respondent for damages as she may prove.

A deliberate act of suicide does not constitute a novus actus interveniens where the deceased's mind was materially impaired by brain injury and resultant depression caused by the wrongdoer's negligence, such that the deceased's ability to make a balanced decision was deleteriously affected. Even though the act of suicide may be deliberate, if the person's judgment is impaired due to injuries sustained in the collision, they cannot be said to have acted with unimpaired volition, and therefore the suicide does not break the chain of legal causation. Legal causation in delict is determined by a flexible approach considering factors including reasonable foreseeability, directness, novus actus interveniens, legal policy, reasonableness, fairness and justice. It is not necessary for the wrongdoer to have foreseen the details of the connection between the injuries and subsequent suicide.

The court left open the question of whether novus actus interveniens is properly a consideration material to legal causation or factual causation, stating it was unnecessary to determine this for purposes of the case. The court also made general observations about the flexible approach to legal causation, emphasizing that any attempt to detract from this flexibility should be resisted, and that one must guard against trying to distill fixed or universally applicable rules from comparisons between cases. The court noted that the argument that a claim must 'in principle' be rejected is misplaced - there is only one 'principle': to determine whether the plaintiff's damage is too remote from the defendant's conduct to be attributed to it, considerations of policy, reasonableness, fairness and justice must be applied to the particular facts of the case.

This is the first case in which the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether suicide by a person with impaired mental faculties constitutes a novus actus interveniens in the chain of causation. The case established important principles regarding legal causation in delict, particularly in cases involving brain injury leading to depression and suicide. It affirmed the application of the flexible approach to legal causation and clarified that deliberate acts may not break the chain of causation where the actor's mental faculties are materially impaired by injuries caused by the wrongdoer. The case is significant for Road Accident Fund claims and personal injury litigation involving psychiatric sequelae of physical injuries.