The Road Accident Fund v Rhesia Scholtz

The respondent, Rhesia Scholtz, was born on 24 March 1976 and was injured in a motor vehicle collision on 3 June 1994 when she was a minor. The identity of the driver who allegedly caused the collision was established. At the time of the collision, the applicable legislation was the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989. The respondent lodged her claim with the appellant (the Road Accident Fund) on 29 February 2000, timeously within the three-year prescription period after attaining majority. Summons was served on 20 July 2000, more than five years after the collision but less than five years from when the respondent reached majority. The Road Accident Fund raised a special plea of prescription, contending that the five-year prescription period in article 57 started running from the date of the collision and was not suspended during the respondent's minority, unlike the three-year period in article 55.

• Whether the five-year prescription period in article 57 of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 runs against a minor
• Whether article 56, which suspends prescription against minors, applies to the five-year prescription period in article 57 or only to the three-year period in article 55
• The proper interpretation of articles 55, 56 and 57 of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 when read together

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

When interpreting articles 55, 56 and 57 of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989, these provisions must be read together and contextually. Article 56, which provides that prescription does not run against a minor, applies to both the three-year prescription period in article 55 and the five-year prescription period in article 57. The words 'referred to in article 55' in article 56 qualify 'a claim for compensation' and not the word 'prescription'. Therefore, the five-year prescription period in article 57 does not run against a minor in respect of claims arising from motor vehicle accidents where the identity of the owner or driver has been established, provided the claim has been lodged under article 62. Article 57 creates a prescriptive period and qualifies article 55, and since article 55 is subject to article 56, the suspension of prescription in favour of minors applies to both the three-year and five-year periods.

The court noted that an unreported judgment by Stegmann J in Toerien and Others v Padongelukkefonds (Case no: 28030/96-WLD) had reached the opposite conclusion, but observed that the learned judge had supplied no reasons for his conclusion and that counsel for the plaintiffs appeared to have made no submissions to the contrary. The court stated: 'For the reasons set out earlier the conclusion reached by Stegmann J about the meaning and effect of the three articles in question is clearly wrong.' The court also observed that if the legislative intention was for the words 'referred to in Article 55' to qualify the word 'prescription' rather than 'a claim for compensation', this could easily have been made clear by wording article 56 as: 'Prescription referred to in Article 55 shall not run...'

This case is significant for establishing the correct interpretation of the prescription provisions in the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989, which was the predecessor to the Road Accident Fund Act. It confirms that minors are protected from prescription running against them in respect of both the three-year and five-year prescription periods applicable to road accident claims, provided the claim is properly lodged. The case demonstrates the importance of reading statutory provisions together and contextually, rather than in isolation. It protects the rights of minors who suffer injuries in motor vehicle accidents by ensuring they have adequate time after reaching majority to pursue their claims. The judgment also demonstrates proper statutory interpretation methodology by examining the legislative history and amendments to understand legislative intent.