Taljaard and Another v The Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa and Others

The Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa (the Land Bank) applied for the provisional liquidation of Project Multiply (Pty) Ltd and Velvet Cream 15 (Pty) Ltd, and the provisional sequestration of the Merwede Trust. The provisional orders were granted by agreement in October 2022 and subsequently confirmed. The appellants, Ms Shanie Taljaard and Curro Consultancy (Pty) Ltd, thereafter launched an urgent application in the Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley, for interim relief pending the finalisation of their application to rescind the liquidation and sequestration orders. They sought orders restraining the liquidators and trustees from proceeding with the liquidation and sequestration, and interdicting the disposal of movable assets and alteration of infrastructure on the farm Onverwacht. The high court dismissed the application, finding it was not urgent and that the appellants lacked locus standi. The appellants appealed with the high court's leave. The respondents raised several preliminary objections, including that the order was not appealable, the appeal was moot because all movable and immovable assets had already been sold and delivered to bona fide purchasers, the creditors' meetings had been concluded, and the farm had been transferred to a third party, and that the matter constituted lis pendens because prior identical applications remained pending.

• Whether the high court's order dismissing the application for interim relief is appealable.
• Whether the appellants had the necessary locus standi to bring the interim application.
• Whether the appeal is moot.
• Whether the dispute is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens.

The appeal is struck from the roll with costs, such costs to include the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the costs of two counsel, where so employed.

An order dismissing an application for interim interdictory relief pending the finalisation of an application to rescind liquidation and sequestration orders is not appealable where it is not final in effect, does not definitively determine the rights of the parties, and does not dispose of a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings. The interests of justice do not render such an interlocutory order appealable where the substantive issues remain pending in the main application and the applicant cannot demonstrate remaining prejudice or irreparable harm necessary to justify appellate intervention. The grant of leave to appeal does not create jurisdiction where the impugned order lacks the requisite characteristics of an appealable decision.

The Court observed that the high court's finding that the appellants lacked locus standi in the interim application was not a final or definitive determination of that issue, distinguishing between the prima facie assessment of evidence appropriate to interim proceedings under Webster v Mitchell and the Plascon-Evans approach applicable to final relief. The Court further noted, in the context of costs, that it was not persuaded that a punitive costs order was warranted despite allegations that the appellants had pursued proceedings with no reasonable prospect of success and had made false and vexatious statements. The Court also noted, without deciding, that the respondents' lis pendens argument was arguable, and discussed the mootness of the appeal because the assets had already been sold.

The judgment reaffirms that the inquiry into whether an order is appealable is a jurisdictional threshold that must be determined before any court may entertain the merits of an appeal. It confirms that the grant of leave to appeal cannot cure a lack of appealability. The case is significant for its restatement of the principles governing the appealability of interlocutory orders, particularly orders refusing interim injunctive relief pending main proceedings, and for the application of the Constitutional Court's broader 'interests of justice' approach in United Democratic Movement v Lebashe Investment Group and the SCA's approach in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von Abo. It reinforces the appellate courts' vigilance against piecemeal litigation and advisory opinions, and illustrates the distinction between the evidentiary standards applicable to interim interdicts (Webster v Mitchell) and final interdicts (Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints Ltd).