Steyn v The State

The appellant, Ms Mavis Pemella Steyn, was convicted on her plea of guilty in the regional court on charges of forgery, uttering and fraud. She was 30 years old, married with two children, employed earning R2 500 per month. While employed at an insurance brokers firm in December 2005, she falsified a valuation certificate relating to a wristwatch and ring by altering it to a certificate for a ring only and substituting her own name for the true owner. In January 2006, she lodged a fraudulent claim with Mutual & Federal Insurance for R42 000 for the loss of the ring, but the claim was not met. She had a previous conviction for fraud, also committed during employment, for which she received a suspended sentence with conditions including compensation payments, which she had defaulted on. The appellant had a troubled upbringing with an abusive, alcoholic father, and was forced to leave school in standard 6 to work to support the family. She was sentenced to two years' imprisonment (suspended for five years) on counts 1 and 2 (forgery and uttering), and five years' imprisonment on count 3 (fraud) under s 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.

• Whether there were reasonable prospects of success in an appeal against sentence
• Whether procedural irregularities regarding further evidence under s 309B(5)(c)(ii) and s 309B(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act were fatal to the proceedings
• Whether the trial court complied with its obligation to record findings and views on further evidence as required by s 309B(5)(c)(ii)
• Whether the sentence imposed was appropriate in light of the appellant's personal circumstances and the gravity of the offence

The application for leave to appeal against the refusal of the appellant's petition in the court below was dismissed.

Where an application for leave to appeal concerns the refusal of a petition for leave to appeal against sentence, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of success in the envisaged appeal against sentence, not the merits of the appeal itself. While s 309B(5)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act is couched in peremptory terms requiring the trial court to record its findings and views on further evidence (including cogency, sufficiency, demeanour and credibility), failure to comply with this provision is not necessarily fatal where the appellate court has the further evidence before it and can assess its cogency and sufficiency itself. This is particularly so for expert evidence on sentence where credibility and demeanour findings are of less importance than for eyewitness evidence on merits. Demeanour has a lesser role to play in assessing the cogency of evidence than the content of the evidence itself. In terms of s 309B(6), further evidence received under s 309B(5) shall be deemed to be evidence taken or admitted at trial for purposes of appeal, and by extension for purposes of a subsequent petition for leave to appeal.

The court made observations about the striking dichotomy between the two pre-sentence reports (by Ms Viljoen and Dr Wessels) but found it unnecessary to resolve these differences for purposes of determining whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court noted that Ms Viljoen did not interview the appellant's mother, and that Dr Wessels reported the appellant's husband's family admitted conveying untruths to Ms Viljoen, though the mother-in-law who was present at court to potentially corroborate this did not testify. The court commented that the sentence imposed provides the appellant with "another opportunity for rehabilitation mostly outside prison" through the conditional suspension on counts 1 and 2 and the possibility of correctional supervision on count 3, suggesting a rehabilitative aspect to sentencing even in cases of repeat offending.

This case clarifies important procedural aspects of the criminal appeal process in South Africa, particularly regarding the handling of further evidence on sentence under s 309B of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. It establishes that procedural irregularities concerning the recording of findings on further evidence, while constituting non-compliance with peremptory provisions, are not necessarily fatal to proceedings where an appellate court can itself assess the evidence. The case also demonstrates the application of sentencing principles where an accused has a prior conviction for similar offences and has violated conditions of a previous suspended sentence, emphasizing that breach of trust in employment situations is a serious aggravating factor that may outweigh personal mitigating circumstances. It illustrates the standard for determining whether leave to appeal should be granted - whether there are reasonable prospects of success - rather than determining the merits of the appeal itself.