The Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) was designed to transport oil from North Dakota to Illinois, crossing the Missouri River at Lake Oahe near the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Reservations. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) in July 2016, concluding an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The Corps then granted permits under Section 408 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Nationwide Permit 12, and later issued an easement under the Mineral Leasing Act in February 2017 allowing pipeline construction under Lake Oahe. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, located 0.55 miles downstream from the crossing, and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, located 73 miles downstream, challenged the Corps' decisions. Both Tribes rely on Lake Oahe for drinking water, fishing, hunting, and religious practices. Lake Oahe was created in 1958 by damming the Missouri River, resulting in the taking of significant tribal lands. The Tribes expressed concerns about oil spill risks, impacts on Treaty rights, and environmental justice, submitting comments and expert reports criticizing the EA's methodology and data.
The Court granted in part and denied in part Standing Rock's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted in part and denied in part the Corps' Cross-Motion. The Court denied in part Cheyenne River's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and deferred decision on claims that may be affected by remand. The matter was remanded to the Corps to address: (1) impacts of oil spills on fishing and hunting rights; (2) environmental justice considerations; and (3) the degree to which the project's effects are likely to be highly controversial. Further briefing was ordered on whether remand should be with or without vacatur of the permits and easement.
Under NEPA, when an agency prepares an EA and issues a FONSI rather than an EIS, it must: (1) take a "hard look" at environmental impacts by ensuring adverse environmental effects are adequately identified and evaluated; (2) make a "convincing case" that no significant impact will result; (3) consider the degree to which effects are "highly controversial" by addressing substantial scientific critiques of methodology and data, not just public opposition; (4) adequately analyze impacts of low-probability, high-consequence events (like oil spills) on all affected resources, including those implicated by treaty rights; and (5) properly assess environmental justice by using appropriate geographic boundaries and considering how spills would disproportionately affect minority and low-income populations, including impacts on subsistence activities. An agency cannot rely on a general trust relationship with Indian tribes to establish a breach of trust claim; plaintiffs must identify specific statutory, treaty, or regulatory provisions establishing concrete fiduciary duties, even when bringing claims under the APA rather than the Indian Tucker Act. This requirement applies regardless of whether the claim seeks equitable relief or damages.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) that "NEPA does not mandate particular consequences" and courts should not substitute their policy judgments for agencies; (2) that while tribal treaty rights have existential and cultural dimensions beyond mere resource impacts, NEPA does not require agencies to conduct such sweeping "existential" analysis—assessing impacts on the specific treaty-protected resource is sufficient; (3) that co-location of pipelines with other infrastructure has benefits like minimized land disturbance; (4) that the streamlining goals of the nationwide permit program would be undermined if extensive environmental review were required at the verification stage; (5) that calculation errors in the EA regarding poverty percentages, while wrong, did not affect the outcome; and (6) expressing implicit criticism of the Corps for confusing the Northern Cheyenne Tribe with Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in its briefing, noting the "unfortunate connotations regarding how distinct Tribes may be perceived." The Court also noted its trust that this was merely "clerical oversight."
This case is significant in South African and U.S. environmental and administrative law contexts for several reasons: (1) it clarifies the scope of environmental review required under NEPA when an agency must consider both the probability and consequences of low-probability, high-consequence events like oil spills; (2) it establishes that agencies must adequately address scientific controversy by responding to expert critiques of methodology and data, not merely dismissing them; (3) it provides guidance on environmental justice analysis, requiring agencies to consider impacts beyond construction effects and to use appropriate geographic boundaries that don't artificially dilute minority populations; (4) it demonstrates the limits of general trust responsibilities to Native American tribes, requiring identification of specific statutory duties; (5) it illustrates the application of the "hard look" doctrine and "convincing case" standard in NEPA review; and (6) it addresses the relationship between different federal permitting schemes (Section 408, MLA, NWP 12) and NEPA compliance. The case also demonstrates judicial restraint in environmental review, showing courts will remand for additional analysis rather than substitute their judgment for agencies, while still holding agencies accountable for procedural compliance.