The applicant, Christinah Tshepiso Seanego, is the owner of unit 009 in Glen Hof Body Corporate in Arcadia, Pretoria. She brought an urgent application to the Community Schemes Ombud Service (CSOS) under section 39(7)(b) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011, complaining that from 9 March 2024 she could no longer use her tag or phone to open the motor gate while on foot. Previously, her old tag allegedly allowed her to open the motor gate even when she was not in a vehicle, which she said was important for emergencies, especially when working late, when her phone was off, or when she had no airtime. She met with the portfolio manager on 13 March 2024, who allegedly undertook to reactivate the old tag but did not do so. The respondent body corporate stated that the scheme has both a pedestrian gate and a motor gate. The pedestrian gate operates through a GSM/cell-to-gate system and the FLUSS Bluetooth app, and the applicant was registered on both. The respondent explained that due to misuse by residents using the motor gate for pedestrian access, the system was changed for all residents so that the motor gate only opens when a vehicle is detected on the loop detector. The respondent said this was a security measure applicable uniformly to all occupants, and that the applicant still had access to the scheme through the pedestrian gate when on foot and the motor gate when in a vehicle.
The application for relief in terms of section 39(7)(b) of the CSOS Act was dismissed in terms of section 53(1)(a) of the CSOS Act. No order as to costs was made.
Where a body corporate changes access control arrangements uniformly for security reasons, and an owner or occupier still retains practical access to the scheme through the pedestrian gate when on foot and the motor gate when in a vehicle, there is no deprivation or legally relevant limitation of access warranting relief under section 39(7)(b) of the CSOS Act. A complaint seeking restoration of a former, more convenient mode of access is misconceived if possession or use of the property is not materially curtailed.
The adjudicator referred to Fisher v Body Corporate Misty Bay and quoted the High Court's statements that access intended to retain possession or use of property may be protected by the mandament van spolie, and that spoliation is a robust remedy aimed at restoring the status quo. These observations were not applied to grant relief because the adjudicator found that the facts did not amount to deprivation or spoliation. The decision also noted generally that urgent adjudication is appropriate where there is deprivation or restriction of essential services or access, although that threshold was not met here.
This decision illustrates the approach of CSOS adjudication to urgent access disputes in community schemes. It distinguishes between complete or material deprivation of access, which may justify urgent intervention and potentially implicate spoliation principles, and a uniform security-related change to access procedures that still leaves an owner able to enter the scheme through appropriate channels. The matter is significant as a practical example of how CSOS applies section 39(7)(b), section 53(1)(a), and the Practice Directive in disputes over gate access in sectional title schemes.