Samuel Mawake Matlare v Die Staat

The appellant and a co-accused (accused 2) were charged with tendering 5,570 counterfeit R200 notes on 28 October 1999, knowing them to be counterfeit, contrary to section 34(1)(b) of the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. Inspector Oosthuizen received information early in 1999 about people wanting to sell counterfeit money and set a trap. A person named Pieter (accused 2) contacted him wanting to sell counterfeit notes with a face value of about R1 million, claiming they were in possession of his friend Sam. After several unsuccessful meetings, a final meeting was arranged at a parking lot in Bela Bela on 28 October 1999. Three persons arrived in a white bakkie matching the pre-arranged description. Accused 2 requested the appellant to fetch a blue plastic bag from the vehicle, which contained the counterfeit notes. After negotiations settling on a purchase price of R240,000, all three occupants were arrested. The third occupant, Mr Ngwane, was released after the appellant and accused 2 confirmed he was merely the driver. Both accused pleaded not guilty at the regional court in Bela Bela. They were convicted and each sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with 4 years suspended for 5 years. The appellant's appeal to the Pretoria High Court was dismissed, and he was subsequently granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

• Whether the trial court was justified in rejecting the appellant's version that he had no knowledge of or participation in the tendering of counterfeit notes by his co-accused
• Whether the conviction under section 34(1)(b) of the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 was correct
• Whether the sentence imposed was so disproportionately severe as to indicate misdirection by the trial court

The appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The binding legal principle is that where an accused's version, even if not directly contradicted in all respects by state witnesses, is so improbable in light of proven facts that it cannot reasonably possibly be true, a court is justified in rejecting that version and convicting the accused. The mere fact that parts of an accused's version are not directly disputed does not mean those parts must be accepted as true - they must still be assessed against the proven facts and inherent probabilities. In offences under section 34(1)(b) of the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 (tendering counterfeit notes knowing them to be counterfeit), the state must prove both the tendering of counterfeit notes and the accused's knowledge of their counterfeit nature, which may be inferred from the circumstances.

The court observed that accused 2's counsel's cross-examination suggestions (that the appellant was the actual seller while accused 2 merely acted as intermediary) should be disregarded in assessing the appellant's version since accused 2 did not testify to support those suggestions. The court also noted that a letter allegedly written by accused 2 to the appellant, which was contested during trial, could be left out of account as irrelevant, a concession properly made by appellant's counsel on appeal. The court remarked that it 'hardly requires argument' that crimes of this nature (large-scale counterfeiting) can lead to great damage in commercial transactions, emphasizing the broader societal harm of currency counterfeiting offences.

This case is significant in South African criminal law as it provides guidance on the assessment of an accused's version in cases involving counterfeit currency offences under the South African Reserve Bank Act. It demonstrates the application of the test for rejection of an accused's version - namely whether it is reasonably possibly true in light of the proven facts. The judgment also illustrates proper sentencing principles in serious economic crimes, balancing personal circumstances of first offenders against the gravity of offences that threaten commercial transactions and the integrity of the currency system. The case reinforces that even where parts of an accused's version are not directly contradicted by state witnesses, such evidence may still be rejected as not reasonably possibly true when viewed against the totality of proven facts and inherent probabilities.