Roy Leslie Bennett v The Parliament of Zimbabwe and Others

Roy Leslie Bennett, a Member of Parliament, was incarcerated at Mutoko Prison pursuant to his committal to imprisonment by Parliament for an effective term of 12 months beginning on 28 October 2004. He was found guilty of contempt in the form of assaulting a member within the precincts of Parliament. Bennett contended that his 12-month prison term would expire simultaneously with the dissolution of Parliament at the end of March 2005, and that with one-third remission, he should have been released on 7 February 2005. He brought an urgent application seeking his immediate release, or alternatively, release on 30 March 2005 when Parliament would be dissolved by virtue of Proclamation 2 of 2005.

• Whether the application satisfied the requirement of urgency
• Whether the applicant was precluded from bringing the application on grounds of lis pendens and/or res judicata
• Whether the applicant was entitled to one-third remission of his sentence in terms of section 109 of the Prisons Act
• The effect of section 63(8) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe on the applicant's prison term
• Whether section 32(2) of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act operated to expunge the applicant's prison term upon the dissolution of Parliament
• Whether Parliament sitting as a court constitutes a 'court of competent jurisdiction' for purposes of the definition of 'convicted prisoner'
• The distinction between contempts under Part V (offences) and section 32 (general contempts) of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act

The application was dismissed with costs.

1. Parliament sitting as a court under section 16(4) of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act constitutes a 'court of competent jurisdiction' for purposes of the definition of 'convicted prisoner' in the Prisons Act. 2. The grant of remission under section 109(1) of the Prisons Act is discretionary ('may') and not automatic, though the exercise of that discretion is subject to administrative law principles. 3. Section 63(8) of the Constitution, which terminates pending parliamentary proceedings upon dissolution, does not apply to completed proceedings resulting in committal to prison. 4. Part V of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act empowers Parliament to act as a court of record with power to impose fixed-term imprisonment extending beyond the parliamentary session, distinguishing such offences from general contempts governed by section 32 which are limited to the current session. 5. Section 32's limitation to the current session applies only to contempts that are NOT declared to be offences under Part V.

The court noted that there appears to be a lacuna in the Prisons (General) Regulations regarding the prescribed conditions for remission under section 109, as no procedural or substantive criteria appear to have been prescribed beyond a mathematical Remission Table. The court suggested that the Second and Third Respondents (Commissioner of Prisons and Minister of Justice) may wish to rectify this deficiency at the earliest opportunity. The court also observed that if remission were denied on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds when due, the applicant would have remedy through judicial review on grounds of illegality, impropriety or gross irrationality, now encapsulated in section 3 of the Administrative Justice Act.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean constitutional and parliamentary law as it clarifies the penal jurisdiction of Parliament and the extent of parliamentary privilege. It establishes that Parliament, when sitting as a court under Part V of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act, exercises the plenary powers of the House of Lords (as a court of record) rather than the limited powers of the House of Commons. This enables Parliament to impose fixed-term imprisonment extending beyond a parliamentary session for specific scheduled offences. The judgment also clarifies the meaning of 'convicted prisoner' to include persons committed by Parliament sitting as a court, and confirms that remission of sentence is a discretionary administrative power subject to judicial review on established administrative law grounds.