This case arose from challenges to various provisions of Pennsylvania Act 13 of 2012 (58 Pa. C.S. §§2301-3504), which repealed and replaced the Oil and Gas Act of 1984. Act 13 created a comprehensive statutory framework regulating oil and gas operations, particularly hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") for unconventional gas wells. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously declared certain provisions unconstitutional in Robinson Township II (83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013)), specifically finding that Sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 violated Article 1, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the Environmental Rights Amendment). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court to address remaining constitutional challenges that had not been previously addressed due to standing or jurisdictional issues, and to determine which provisions of Act 13 were severable from the invalidated sections. The specific challenges on remand concerned: (1) Section 3218.1's requirement to notify only public drinking water facilities (not private well owners) following spills; (2) Sections 3222.1(b)(10) and (11) requiring health professionals to sign confidentiality agreements before receiving information about trade secret hydraulic fracturing chemicals; (3) Section 3241(a) conferring eminent domain power on corporations to appropriate property for natural gas storage; and (4) the severability of Sections 3302 and 3305-3309 relating to PUC review of local zoning ordinances and impact fee withholding.
The application and enforcement of 58 Pa. C.S. §3302 as it relates to Chapter 33 of Act 13, and 58 Pa. C.S. §§3305, 3306, 3307, 3308, and 3309(a) in their entirety were enjoined. Counts IV, V, XI, and XII of Petitioners' petition for review were dismissed. The remaining challenged provisions (Sections 3218.1, 3241(a), and 3222.1(b)(10) and (11)) were upheld as constitutional.
The binding legal principles established include: (1) Under Article III, Section 32's special law prohibition and equal protection principles, legislative classifications between public and private water suppliers are constitutionally permissible when based on real distinctions such as the regulatory scope of DEP authority, historical statutory treatment, and practical feasibility of providing notice; (2) Section 1925 of the Statutory Construction Act creates a presumption of severability, but procedural enforcement provisions are not severable when they are so dependent on invalidated substantive provisions that the remaining statutory scheme cannot be executed in accordance with legislative intent and the uniform enforcement mechanism envisioned by the General Assembly is no longer viable; (3) Provisions requiring disclosure of trade secret information to health professionals with confidentiality agreements do not constitute special legislation when they create uniform statewide rules equally applicable to all members of the affected industries and professions; (4) Statutes conferring eminent domain power on corporations "empowered to transport, sell or store natural gas" apply only to public utilities with certificates of public convenience, not private corporations, and therefore do not authorize takings for private use; (5) Provisions related to disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals satisfy the single subject requirement of Article III, Section 3 when they are germane to the main objective of regulating oil and gas operations.
The majority noted that even though Section 3218.1 does not require notice to private well owners, "that does not mean that in the event of a spill that either the DEP or the drilling company should not or will not use its best efforts to notify the affected community, even though it is not required to do so." The court expressed the expectation that "in the event of a spill, the DEP will, in all likelihood, canvas the areas to identify individuals served by private wells and notify them of the spill and aid them in getting alternative water supplies," and that "drilling companies should make similar undertakings as good corporate citizens." Judge Brobson's dissent argued that the presumption of severability should have been applied differently, noting that Sections 3305-3309 remain available in three distinct situations (violations of the MPC, Chapter 33, and Chapter 32), and the invalidation of two sections within Chapter 33 should not render the entire enforcement mechanism unavailable. Judge McCullough's concurring/dissenting opinion expressed concern that the classification between public and private water suppliers may not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest given that most gas drilling occurs in rural areas with greater reliance on private wells, and that inter-agency cooperation could provide DEP with private well location information.
This case is significant in Pennsylvania environmental and administrative law as it addressed the continued viability of Act 13's regulatory scheme following the Supreme Court's partial invalidation based on the Environmental Rights Amendment. The decision clarified the scope of legislative preemption of local oil and gas regulation and the limits of such preemption under Pennsylvania's constitutional environmental protections. The severability analysis established important precedent regarding when procedural enforcement mechanisms must fall with invalidated substantive provisions. The decision also addressed the balance between trade secret protection and public health information disclosure in the context of hydraulic fracturing operations. The case demonstrates the ongoing tension between statewide uniform regulation of the oil and gas industry and local municipalities' traditional land use and environmental protection powers. The decision's treatment of the confidentiality provisions for medical professionals became particularly important for public health monitoring of fracking impacts.