Road Traffic Management Corporation v Tasima (Pty) Ltd

Tasima (Pty) Ltd operated the electronic National Traffic Information system (eNaTIS) for nearly 15 years, employing 80 employees dedicated solely to this business. Following a Constitutional Court order on 23 June 2015, the eNaTIS system and services were transferred from Tasima to the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC). The RTMC took physical transfer of the system on 5 April 2017 but refused to accept transfer of any employees. Tasima brought an urgent application to compel the transfer. The Labour Court (Steenkamp J) declared that the employment contracts of the 5th to 84th respondents transferred automatically to RTMC under section 197 of the Labour Relations Act and ordered the RTMC to pay the employees pending final determination. The Labour Appeal Court partly upheld the decision, amended the effective transfer date to 23 June 2015, but set aside the payment order. The RTMC applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, suspending the operation of the order. Tasima then brought an application under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act to reverse the suspension and enforce the order. Prinsloo J granted this application, ordering that the Labour Appeal Court order operates pending all appeals and that RTMC must take transfer of the employees within 24 hours. The RTMC appealed this decision under section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act.

• Whether a court has jurisdiction under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act to order consequential relief beyond the declaratory relief granted in the original judgment
• Whether the requirements of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act were satisfied to reverse the automatic suspension of the order pending appeal
• Whether consequential relief ad factum praestandum and ad pecuniam solvendam could be inferred from a declaratory order
• Whether execution can be granted when the performance and amounts payable are not definitively ascertainable from the judgment

The appeal in terms of section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act was upheld. The order of the Labour Court was set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the application. The respondent (Tasima) was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

A court exercising powers under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act to reverse the suspension of an order pending appeal is limited to reversing the suspension of the specific order that is subject to appeal. It has no jurisdiction to grant consequential relief (whether ad factum praestandum or ad pecuniam solvendam) that was not part of the original judgment. Consequential relief should not be inferred from a declaratory order, particularly in the context of reversing suspension pending appeal. Execution is ordinarily only available when a lis has been definitively and judicially resolved, meaning the judgment must definitively establish what money or thing the judgment debtor must deliver. Where the amounts payable or performance due are not definitively ascertainable from the judgment, execution is not appropriate. The jurisdictional pre-requisites of section 18(3) - exceptional circumstances, proof of irreparable harm to the applicant, and no irreparable harm to the respondent - must be strictly established.

The Court noted that under common law, courts did not have power to grant declaratory orders without consequential relief, but over time courts have accepted that declarations of rights may be granted even if other consequential relief could have been granted. It is permissible to seek and grant a declaratory order in advance of suing under a different cause of action for consequential relief, such as payment of remuneration. This approach is not contrary to the rule that a party can sue only once upon a single cause of action. The Court observed that the employees may well have a claim for consequential relief compelling the RTMC to accept tender of their services and to pay remuneration under the transferred contracts of employment, but neither Steenkamp J nor the Labour Appeal Court on appeal had granted such relief. The Court also noted that had Steenkamp J simply ordered payment of salaries as relief consequential upon the declaratory order (rather than making it an order pending appeals), the situation might have been different.

This case establishes important principles regarding the scope of relief available under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act when seeking to reverse the automatic suspension of orders pending appeal. It clarifies that: (1) A court cannot grant consequential relief under section 18(3) that was not part of the original judgment subject to appeal; (2) The distinction between declaratory relief and consequential relief (ad factum praestandum and ad pecuniam solvendam) is significant in the context of execution pending appeal; (3) Courts should not readily infer consequential relief from declaratory orders, particularly in exceptional circumstances applications; (4) Execution requires that the judgment definitively establish what must be delivered or paid; (5) The jurisdictional requirements of section 18(3) must be strictly established. The case also reinforces the principle that section 18 of the Superior Courts Act applies to the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court as superior courts. It demonstrates the courts' reluctance to extend relief beyond what was expressly ordered, particularly where factual uncertainties exist regarding entitlement to the relief sought.