Road Accident Fund v Sheriff of the High Court, Pretoria and Others; Road Accident Fund v Stoffels and Another

The Road Accident Fund (RAF) brought two appeals concerning post-judgment interest on awards of unliquidated damages where court orders were silent on interest. In the Sheriff matter (case 268/2025), the RAF sought declaratory relief in the Gauteng High Court that writs of execution levying interest not provided for in court orders are invalid and that such writs must be accompanied by sworn calculations. In the Stoffels matter (case 1182/2024), two respondents (Stoffels and Herold) were awarded damages against the RAF following motor vehicle accidents. Court orders awarded capital amounts and costs but were silent on interest. The RAF paid the capital months after judgment but refused to pay interest on the delayed payment. Both summonses had included prayers for interest. The RAF relied on an internal directive/Treasury instruction not to pay interest where court orders were silent. The RAF argued that s 2A(5) of the PRIA governed post-judgment interest on unliquidated claims and required specific court orders before interest liability arose. The RAF also raised concerns about ministerial delays and errors in publishing prescribed interest rates under s 1(2)(b) of the PRIA.

• Whether post-judgment interest on RAF judgment debts arises ex lege under s 2(1) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 (PRIA) in the absence of an express court order for interest
• Whether s 2A(5) of the PRIA applies to post-judgment interest on unliquidated claims or is limited to pre-judgment interest
• Whether s 17(3)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 excludes or modifies the operation of the PRIA in RAF matters
• Whether the doctrine of res judicata precludes judgment creditors who claimed interest in their summonses from subsequently claiming interest where the court order is silent
• Whether post-judgment interest accrues ex lege on costs orders under the definition of 'judgment debt' in s 2(3) of the PRIA
• Whether writs of execution for post-judgment interest are procedurally irregular absent an accompanying affidavit quantifying the interest claimed
• Whether uncertainty surrounding ministerial publication of prescribed interest rates justifies declaratory relief requiring courts to determine rates in each case
• Whether the RAF's application for declaratory relief in the Sheriff matter was competent under s 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act

Both appeals dismissed. In case 268/2025 (Sheriff matter): appeal dismissed; RAF ordered to pay costs of respondents who filed heads of argument, on party and party scale, including costs of two counsel where employed. In case 1182/2024 (Stoffels matter): appeal dismissed; RAF ordered to pay respondents' costs including costs of two counsel where employed, on Scale C.

Post-judgment interest on all judgment debts, including awards of unliquidated damages against the Road Accident Fund, arises ex lege by operation of s 2(1) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 and runs automatically unless the court order expressly provides otherwise. Section 2A of the PRIA governs only pre-judgment interest on unliquidated claims; once judgment is given, the debt becomes a judgment debt under s 2(3) and is governed by s 2, not s 2A. Section 2A(5) is a permissive provision enabling courts to make fact-specific pre-judgment interest awards and does not require a specific court order before post-judgment interest becomes payable. Section 17(3)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 modifies the general ex lege position by deferring the commencement of interest to 14 days after the date of the court order; it does not exclude the operation of s 2(1) of the PRIA. Post-judgment interest is a legal consequence, not a cause of action requiring adjudication; silence in a court order does not constitute an adverse determination and does not trigger res judicata. Judgment debt under s 2(3) of the PRIA includes orders as to costs; therefore, post-judgment interest accrues ex lege on costs orders. The prescribed rate of interest under s 1 of the PRIA, as amended in 2015, is determined by the statutory formula (repurchase rate plus 3.5%) and takes effect by operation of s 1(2)(c) based on SARB determinations; ministerial publication serves a confirmatory function and its absence does not prevent the rate from taking effect.

The court noted obiter that it endorsed the reasoning in Drake Flemmer and Orsmond Inc v Gajjar NO regarding s 17(3)(a) of the RAF Act potentially precluding recovery of pre-judgment interest, which would exclude the operation of s 2A of the PRIA in RAF matters, but found it unnecessary to decide this issue definitively as the appeals concerned only post-judgment interest. The court declined to impose punitive costs despite the RAF's failure on all grounds, acknowledging that the questions raised had generated extensive and conflicting High Court litigation and that there was a legitimate systemic interest in obtaining appellate clarification, even though existing authorities strongly disfavored the RAF's position. The court observed that the Minister of Justice's failures in complying with the publication obligation under s 1(2)(b) of the PRIA have been unsatisfactory and are properly the subject of complaint directed at the executive, but noted this does not justify requiring courts to embark on rate determinations in each case. The court commented that if a dispute arises as to the applicable rate for a particular period, it may be resolved by way of affidavit or supplementary inquiry into relevant Gazette notices. The court noted that an indemnity given to a sheriff to override the absence of a lawful basis for execution would be irregular, but found no basis for declaring all indemnities in RAF matters unlawful given that post-judgment interest arises ex lege and writs for such interest are valid.

This case authoritatively settles the law on post-judgment interest in Road Accident Fund litigation and clarifies the interaction between the PRIA and the RAF Act. It confirms that post-judgment interest arises automatically by operation of law on all judgment debts, including RAF compensation awards, unless expressly excluded by court order. The judgment draws a clear distinction between pre-judgment interest (governed by s 2A of the PRIA) and post-judgment interest (governed by s 2 of the PRIA), rejecting attempts to read s 2A(5) as a gateway provision for post-judgment interest. The case provides important guidance on the operation of s 17(3)(a) of the RAF Act as a modifier of the general ex lege position, not a displacement of it. It also clarifies that ministerial publication failures do not create uncertainty justifying case-by-case judicial determinations of interest rates, as rates are ascertainable from the statutory formula. The judgment reinforces that res judicata does not apply to ex lege entitlements and that creditors need not plead post-judgment interest to claim it. This decision has significant financial implications for the RAF and provides certainty to road accident victims and their legal representatives regarding post-judgment interest entitlements.